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funds, but greater performance dispersion across funds. In examining the determinants
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1. Introduction
Performance competition is one of the central tenets of the academic study of asset
management. Because investors respond positively to good performance and manage-
ment fees are proportional to fund size, evidence suggesting that managers compete
to outperform one another is not surprising. There is a long literature examining this
performance competition, specifically among mutual fund managers. Brown, Harlow,
and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) show that fund managers exhibit
tournament-like behavior consistent with strong incentives to outperform.1 Overall, this
literature suggests that managers have strong incentives to compete on performance.
Separate from this literature on manager competition, there is a growing literature
documenting coordinated behavior across funds that are part of the same fund family.
Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) find evidence consistent with the strategic transfer
of performance from low-to high-value funds within a family. Bhattacharya, Lee, and
Pool (2013) show that affiliated fund-of-mutual funds invest in other funds in the family
when redemptions from those funds become severe. While these actions can be justified
from the perspective of maximizing the value of the fund family, they suggest a degree of
cooperation among fund managers that stands in stark contrast to the suggested compe-
tition documented in the manager tournament literature. How can we reconcile evidence
of both cooperation and competition among fund managers? Are the investment deci-
sions of each fund manager focused on maximizing their own fund’s performance or the
overall value of the investment advisor?
In this paper, we examine how competitive and cooperative fund manager incentives
affect fund and family strategies and outcomes. We begin our analysis by constructing
two indices of fund manager incentives, competitive and cooperative, and then taking
the difference between the two to get a net competitive/cooperative incentive index.
Looking to the academic literature on asset management to guide our index construc-
tion, we identify 12 variables that have been used to characterize fund manager incen-
1Kempf and Ruenzi (2007) examine tournaments within mutual fund families and find that managers
adjust their risk in response to their performance rank within the family relative to other funds in
the same investment objective. Schwarz (2011) suggests a methodological improvement in measuring
tournament behavior using fund holdings but also finds strong evidence of managerial performance
competition.
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tives and classify them as competitive or cooperative. While the data source and unit
of observation differs across the variables, they fall into two broad categories: manager
compensation incentives (e.g., manager ownership of the fund corresponds to competi-
tive, manager ownership of the investment advisor corresponds to cooperative) and fund
management structure (e.g., solo-managed fund corresponds to competitive or team-
managed corresponds to cooperative).2 For each of the 12 variables, the average across
all funds in the family is computed, and this family-level average is ranked within the
cross-section. To aggregate them into a single competitive (cooperative) incentive index
for each family and date, an equal-weighted average of the six family-level competitive
(cooperative) variable ranks is calculated.
We then use these indices to examine the relation between family incentives and
both fund and family outcomes. We would expect managers who work for families with
cooperative incentive schemes to be more willing to assist other managers in the same
family. To test for the existence of cooperation, we examine the impact of incentives
on cross-trading and cross-holdings. Cross-trading, or the crossing of trades between
two funds in a family, and cross-holding, or the purchase of one fund in the family by
another, are cooperative activities. The evidence in Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006)
and Bhattacharya, Lee, and Pool (2013) suggest that cross-trading and cross-holding,
respectively, can be used to transfer performance from low-to high-value funds. If the
compensation scheme at the advisor is competitive in nature, it would be surprising for
one manager to sacrifice the performance of his or her own fund (and their compensation)
even if there was a net benefit to the family. However, a cooperative incentive scheme,
like bonuses tied to the overall profitability of the fund family, might induce a manager
to sacrifice the performance of his or her own fund by offering performance transfer via
cross-trading or flow insurance via cross-holding. When we examine the determinants
of cross-trading and cross-holding, we find that families with a cooperative incentive
scheme are more likely to have higher levels of cross-trading and cross-holdings.
2The six competitive incentive variables include a solo-managed fund indicator; three indicator
variables of whether or not a manager’s bonus was based on fund performance, fund revenue, or paid
in fund shares; a Coles incentive rate variable measuring the concavity of the fund fee; and the range
of manager ownership of a fund. The six cooperative incentives variables include: a team-managed
fund indicator, the average ratio of the number of managers per fund, and a measure of the degree
of manager interconnection within the family; two indicator variables of whether or not the manager’s
bonus is paid in advisor equity or based on advisor level activities of the manager; and an indicator
variable of whether or not the fund’s fee is based on the assets or performance of other funds in the
family. The Appendix walks through a specific example of the index construction for the Janus Fund.
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For competitive incentives, we first examine the relation to manager effort using
active share and tracking error as proxies. We find managers in families with greater
competitive incentives have higher active share and tracking error. While this result
is also consistent with competitive incentives attracting managers with higher ability,
we also examine the active share and tracking error of managers who move from a
cooperative to a competitive incentive scheme, thereby controlling for manager ability,
and we find both measures increase, consistent with incentivizing greater effort.
To better understand how competitive and cooperative incentives affect the firm
overall, we turn to the internal capital markets literature that provides an important
framework for our tests. Williamson’s (1975) seminal work on the boundaries of a firm,
formalized in Stein (1997), point to managerial incentives at a division level as a key
determinant of the efficacy of internal capital markets:
“Closer adherence to the goals of the general management can be secured if the special
incentive machinery to which internal organization uniquely has access is consciously
exercised to favor operating behavior that is consistent with the general management’s
objectives. . . That salaries and bonuses can be adjusted to reflect differential operating
performance, assuming that such differentials exist and can be discerned, is a familiar
application of the incentive machinery.”
If their incentives encourage division managers to cooperate with the CEO and
each other in trying to achieve the overall aims of the firm (“behavior. . . consistent
with. . . general management’s objectives”), internal capital markets can be firm-value
improving. While cooperative incentives increase firm-wide cooperative behaviors such
as cross-trading and cross-holding, the net effect to the firm is unclear. Hann, Ogneva,
and Ozbas (2013) provide one perspective on how effective internal capital markets
should affect the firm. Specifically, they show that when efficient investment occurs via
internal capital markets, the coinsurance inherent in such an arrangement can reduce
systematic risk across the firm. In our mutual fund setting, we test for this coinsurance
effect using two measures. First, in the full sample, we look at the volatility of advisor
revenue as a proxy for cash flows and find higher cooperative incentives are associated
with lower volatility. Second, while advisor revenue is only a proxy for firm cash flows,
for a subset of our sample managed by publicly traded investment advisors, we collect
actual firm cash flows and the associated return on assets. Consistent with a coinsurance
3
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effect, both cash flow and return on assets volatility decrease with increased cooperative
incentives.
The internal capital markets literature also sheds light on competitive incentives.
Both Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) model in-
ternal capital markets where the incentives of division managers differ from those of
the CEO or “headquarters.” These differences in incentives, consistent with division
or fund-specific competitive incentives, result in distortions in optimal resource alloca-
tion. Consistent with such distortions, we find that funds from families with competitive
incentives exhibit less cross-trading and cross-holding and greater dispersion in fund re-
turns across the family (i.e., more winners and losers). While these “dark side” models
highlight how competitive incentives can skew the split of the surplus across parties, they
don’t allow for such incentives to increase the size of the surplus generated by different
incentives. When we look at performance, however, we find that competitive incentives
are associated with a higher percentage of “star” funds and higher average performance
overall, consistent with incentivizing greater effort or attracting managers with higher
abilities.
Our competitive incentives results taken as a whole highlight the important trade-off
that such incentives provide. While the lack of coordination between the objectives of
these higher effort/higher skill managers and the investment advisor may result in the
dark side of internal capital markets, those negative effects must be weighed against
higher overall performance in our context or a larger overall surplus in a more general
internal capital markets context.
While both competitive and cooperative incentives have pros and cons, the sample
consists of investment advisors with both net competitive and net cooperative incentives.
Moreover, family transitions from one incentive scheme to the other are infrequent,
suggesting a fixed incentive regime over time.3 What factors then determine which
incentive scheme each family chooses? Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2018) propose a model
that gives us some insight into what strategic dimensions of an investment advisor’s
business might be associated with each incentive choice. They model the equilibrium
choice of investors to invest directly or to use an asset manager to invest on their behalf.
3Transitions from above median cooperative incentives to below median constitute only 0.95% of
the sample, and transitions from below median cooperative to above median cooperative constitute only
1.59% of the sample.
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They find that institutional investors (i.e., investors with lower search costs relative to
their assets to be invested) benefit from searching for informed managers. Considering
our results in the context of their model, we find that competitive investment advisors are
more likely to have institutional clients, and cooperative advisors are more likely to sell
through a broker channel. Our results are consistent with their model on two dimensions.
First, with greater competitive incentives, cross-fund subsidization is discouraged. As a
result, the performance or quality signal about each manager is clearer in a competitive
fund family since fund performance is more likely to represent manager ability than intra-
family support. If institutional investors benefit from searching for superior managers,
they would be more likely to search among competitively incentivized fund managers.
Second, if retail investors have less ability to identify superior managers, selecting a
manager from a competitive family may constitute additional risk due to the greater
dispersion of performance outcomes. Broker-sold funds, on the other hand, exhibit
less dispersion, and the selection of the manager is outsourced to someone else. The
analog in Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2018) is their prediction that small investors should
choose passive vehicles, but their result is also driven by the risk of uninformed investor
choice between funds/managers with disperse performance outcomes. As a whole, our
results are consistent with the equilibrium proposed by and the intuition underlying the
Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2018) model.
One possible concern with our analysis is the potential endogeneity of the fund fam-
ily’s incentive scheme choice. To address this issue, we use investment advisor mergers
as an exogenous source of incentive variation (i.e., a competitive advisor acquires a co-
operative advisor) and confirm our primary results regarding family incentives affecting
portfolio outcomes. We also employ a falsification test, creating a pseudo family from
our sample of funds that is matched on family size and investment-style characteristics
but not on incentives. Consistent with competitive and cooperative incentives driving
the results, when we repeat the primary tests in the paper, we find no relation between
incentives and outcomes for random family assignments.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data used and the
construction of the competition/cooperation measure. We then present our results in
two sections. First, in Section 3 we present the family-level outcomes of competitive in-
centives (performance and dispersion) and cooperative incentives (family revenue, cash
5
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986304 
flow and return on assets volatility). Second, in Section 4 we then examine evidence on
potential mechanisms of how incentives could affect family-level outcomes. For compet-
itive incentives, we look at active share and tracking error. For cooperative incentives,
we look at the coordinated activities of cross-trading and cross-holding. Section 5 ex-
amines why fund families differ in their incentive structure. Section 6 shows additional
robustness tests conducted, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Data
We examine actively managed US mutual funds from five different asset classes:
domestic and international equity, domestic and international bond, and balanced port-
folios, over the 1992-2015 time period. We combine data from several sources for our
analysis. First, advisory and portfolio manager incentive contract data come from the
Securities and Exchange Commision (SEC) semiannual N-SAR and the statement of
additional information (SAI) filings. As of 2005, the SEC started requiring advisors to
disclose the factors used to determine the compensation of individual fund managers in
the fund’s SAI; therefore, the individual contract data from this statement run from 2005
to 2015.4 The N-SAR data are available through the SEC EDGAR database starting in
1996.
Second, we use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivorship Bias-
Free Mutual Funds Database. It provides names of the management companies, funds
returns, total net assets under management (TNA), funds inceptions, turnover, expenses,
and other fund and family characteristics. While CRSP provides portfolio manager
names (only last names when the fund has multiple managers), a unique identifier for
those managers is not available. To assign a unique identifier to each manager, we obtain
the full names of managers from Morningstar Direct and append that data to the mutual
fund portfolio manager and company names retrieved from CRSP. This manager history
data predate the beginning of our sample period. Morningstar Direct also provides the
portfolio manager fund ownership data that begin in 2005.
Finally, the CRSP and Thomson Reuters mutual fund holdings databases are used to
compute the portfolio level cross-trading and cross-holding measures, respectively. The
4Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered Management Investment Companies, SEC
Release No. IC-26533 (2005).
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CRSP data have a higher reporting frequency and are therefore used to identify cross-
trades (matched purchase and sale transactions of the same number of shares of the same
stock from two funds in the same family) at a monthly frequency from 2004 to 2015. The
quarterly Thompson holdings data cover our sample period (1992-2015) and are used for
the cross-holdings measure where higher frequency data are not required. Additionally,
we use data on investment advisors’ cross-trading practices from the uniform application
for investment advisor registration (form ADV) that are available from 2001 to 2015.
In these filings, the SEC requires fund advisors to report on the extent of their cross-
trading activity, avoiding the need to infer it from holdings or trade data. All stock-level
information is obtained from CRSP. The definition of all variables used in the analysis
is provided in the Data Appendix.
2.1. Competition and cooperation indices
To estimate the nature of incentives at the advisor level, we construct both a com-
petitive and cooperative incentives index. To construct these indices, we first identify
from the academic literature variables used to characterize fund manager incentives and
classify them as competitive or cooperative. While our empirical design focuses on the
overall incentive environment at the investment advisor, we also provide the regression
results for each of the individual components in the Internet Appendix (i.e., see Tables
A1, A2, and A3) for completeness. Below we describe the motivation and the data
sources for the different components of these two indices. We also provide a detailed
example of how the index is constructed for a specific fund and family in the Appendix.
2.1.1. Individual versus team fund management
There are a number of papers that examine the role of individual versus team man-
agement in mutual funds.5 While the focus of these papers is not incentives per se, they
do give insight into how the investment advisor’s decision to put a single individual or a
team in charge of a fund relates to those incentives. Bliss, Potter, and Schwarz (2008),
for example, find that team-managed funds have less performance dispersion and greater
similarity in their portfolio factor loadings than their individual-managed counterparts
5For example; see Prather and Middleton (2002); Bliss, Porter, and Schwarz (2008); Massa, Reuter,
and Zitzewitz (2010); Bar, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2011); Rau (2015); Patel and Sarkissian (2017); and
Adams, Nishikawa, and Rao (2018).
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consistent with greater cooperation among team managers. While the focus of Massa,
Reuter, and Zitzewitz (2010) is the role of anonymous teams, their results also show that
team funds are more likely to cross-subsidize other funds. They also find evidence consis-
tent with greater labor incentives for named solo managers that might engender greater
effort or attract individuals with greater ability. Together, these papers suggest that
team-managed funds and the associated network of interconnected managers within an
advisor may engender cooperative behavior across funds in the family. Similarly, the in-
cremental flows and greater labor mobility associated with named solo managers suggests
competitive incentive implications for funds with solo/individual managers. For these
reasons, we include in our indices a measure of individual-managed funds, team-managed
funds, the number of managers per fund, and the interconnectedness of managers across
funds.
These four manager variables are constructed from the Morningstar manager history
data. The data cover our entire sample period of 1992 to 2015 and form the foundation
for our competitive and cooperative indices. Using this history of managers, we calculate
the proportion of funds within a family that is managed by an individual fund manager
(Individual fund) and by a team, (Team fund) and the average managers per fund
(Managers/Fund ratio) across the family. We also use these data to calculate a measure
of how interconnected managers are across different funds in the family. This measure
is calculated as the ratio of the number of funds in the family with manager overlap
(at least one manager is on the team overseeing both funds) in the same investment
objective divided by the number of funds in the family in the same investment objective
(Manager connected).
2.1.2. Manager compensation
Farnsworth and Taylor (2006) provide a broad overview of potential incentive mecha-
nisms through their manager survey of the determinants of portfolio manager compensa-
tion. These mechanisms include both fund-level variables (e.g., fund performance, assets,
flows) and advisor level variables (e.g., advisor profitability, stock price performance,
nonperformance-related factors such as employee development, and noncash or equity
compensation). Supportive of the motivation underlying our paper, Farnsworth and
Taylor (2006) express surprise at how important the advisor-level variables are reported
8
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to be by managers relative to fund-level determinants. In discussing why this might be
the case, they point to the mutual fund late-trading scandal as anecdotal evidence of the
role of cooperative incentives. Specifically, they point out that the late-trading scandal
required mutual fund managers to cooperate in sacrificing the performance of their own
fund to benefit the advisor as a whole. This cooperation would be harder to obtain if
the manager’s investment performance determines bonuses but much easier to obtain
when firm profits determine bonuses.
While the Farnsworth and Taylor (2006) analysis consists of a small sample of survey
responses, two recent papers have collected and analyzed investment advisor managerial
incentive disclosures. Using the 2005 SEC rule change requiring investment advisors
to detail the determinants of manager compensation, Ma, Tang, and Gomez (2018)
analyze a set of manager incentive variables including whether or not a manager’s com-
pensation is based on fund performance, advisor profitability, and whether or not it
is paid via deferred compensation. Lee, Trzcinka, and Venkatesan (2018) also collect
manager compensation variables to revisit the manager risk-shifting hypothesis. They
identify whether or not a manager’s bonus is determined relative to a benchmark and
how clearly that benchmark is identified.
Drawing on the insights of Farnsworth and Taylor (2006), Ma, Tang, and Gomez
(2018), and Lee, Trzcinka, and Venkatesan (2018), we collect a similar set of managerial
incentive variables. For our competitive index, we include three indicator variables as
to whether or not a manager’s bonus is determined by fund performance (Bonus-fund
performance), fund revenue (Bonus-fund revenue), and whether or not the bonus was
paid, at least in part, by a grant of fund shares (Bonus-paid in fund shares). For the
cooperative index, we include indicator variables as to whether or not a manager’s bonus
is paid in equity of the advisor (Bonus-Paid in advisor equity)6 and had advisor-level
determinants (Bonus-Advisor Level Determinant).7 The latter variable is yes when the
compensation disclosure makes clear that manager level effort in advisor-level activities
6Our bonus paid in fund shares/equity of the advisor differs somewhat from the deferred com-
pensation variable collected by Ma, Tang, and Gomez (2018). Instead of aggregating all deferred
compensation types, we separate out advisor equity and fund share grants as compensation, regardless
of whether they are deferred or not.
7Our advisor-level determinants variable also differs from the Ma, Tang, and Gomez (2018) advisor
profitability variable. While many investment advisors indicate that the size of their bonus pool depends
on the overall profitability of the advisor, our advisor-level determinants variable focuses instead on the
use of manager level effort/activity as it relates to advisor-level activities being used to determine a
bonus. We discuss this issue in more detail in the Appendix.
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(e.g., employee mentoring, advisor strategy) is used as a factor in determining the bonus.
As an additional measure of cooperative incentives, we also include an indicator of
whether or not the fund’s advisory fee was based entirely or partially on the performance,
assets, and income of other funds in the family (Other funds fee).8 If the advisory fee
is based not only on the fund in question but on other funds, a manager of a fund with
such a fee arrangement may be more inclined to cooperate with the managers of other
funds upon which the joint fee criteria is based.
The three competitive (Bonus-fund performance, Bonus-fund revenue, and Bonus-
paid in fund shares) and two cooperative (Bonus-paid in advisor equity, and Bonus-
advisor level determinant) manager compensation variables are hand collected from each
fund’s SAI filings. The SEC first required investment advisors to disclose the determi-
nants of manager compensation in late 2005. Because of the difficulty of collecting these
data by hand and because they do not change much over time as documented by Ma,
Tang, and Gomez (2018), we collect two snapshots of the data from 2006 and 2009 and
backfill the data to cover the sample period of our team management variables.9 The
cooperative fund advisory fee variable (Other funds fee) is taken from question 52 of the
fund’s semiannual report or N-SAR. These N-SAR reports are required for all funds by
late 1995, so before this date, we backfill this variable with the earliest observational
value.
2.1.3. Coles incentive rate
Massa and Patgiri (2009) examine the role of manager incentives on performance
and risk-taking. While they do not measure manager incentives directly, they follow the
insights of Coles, Suay, and Woodbury (2000) in using the shape of the fund advisory
contract as a proxy for those incentives.
Specifically, they calculate the percentage change in the advisory fee between the
highest TNA and lowest TNA breakpoints, a measure that they term Cole’s incentive
rate (CIR). The intuition behind their measure is simply that fund managers with a
linear advisory fee (CIR of zero) have greater incentives to generate performance as
8As an example, the Fidelity Diversified Stock Fund pays a management fee to the advisor (FMR)
that adds a group fee rate of 0.25% to an individual fund fee of 0.17%. The group fee rate is based on
the average net assets of all the mutual funds advised by FMR.
9Our results are robust to restricting the sample period to the availability of the common data
period (2005-2015); see Internet Appendix Table A4, panel G.
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the fund size grows, compared to managers with concave fee structure (CIR less than
zero). Consistent with a competitive incentive, they find that a higher CIR results in
higher performance and risk-taking. Given this strong support for CIR as a measure of
competitive incentives, we include it in our index (CIR).
To calculate the CIR measure, we collect each fund’s response to N-SAR question 48.
CIR measures the concavity of the advisory contract defined as the difference between
the last and first marginal compensation rates divided by the effective marginal com-
pensation rate. Thus, the shape of the contract takes the value zero for linear contracts
and negative values for concave contracts, with the competitive incentive increasing as
this variable increases.
2.1.4. Manager ownership
Last of all, Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007) show that manager fund ownership
is positively related to performance. Using the March 2005 SEC rule change requir-
ing disclosure of manager ownership in a fund (the SEC requires managers to disclose
the value of their fund ownership across 7 ranges: None; $1-$10,000; $10,001-$50,000;
$50,001-$100,000; $100,001-$500,000; $500,001-$1,000,000; or more than $1,000,000),
they examine both the determinants of manager ownership and its impact on perfor-
mance. While the increase in performance is modest (∼3 basis points for a 1 basis point
increase in ownership), the Khorana, Servaes, and Wedge (2007) results are consistent
with increased competitive incentives due to the manager’s ownership in their specific
fund. Consequently, we include a measure of manager ownership (Manager ownership)
in our competition index. To capture the manager fund ownership level, we use Morn-
ingstar’s ownership range data, which rank manager ownership from one to seven across
the seven ranges, with a higher rank corresponding to higher ownership.
2.1.5. Competition, cooperation, and net competition indices construction
The competition index is constructed at the management company-year level as
the average across the six competition variables described above: Individual Fund con-
structed from the Morningstar manager history data; Bonus-fund performance, Bonus-
fund revenue, Bonus-paid in fund shares hand collected from the SAI filings; CIR mea-
sure constructed from the N-SAR advisory fee reporting; and the Manager ownership
11
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range from Morningstar.
We average each of the variables across all funds in the family. We then calculate a
decile rank of the family-level variable across all families for a given date, to remove any
time trends. The competition index for family i at time t is then the average of these
six rank variables described above, which ranges from zero to one:
Competitioni,t = (Individual fund
DecRnk
i,t +Bonus-fund performance
DecRnk
i,t
+Bonus-paid fund sharesDecRnki,t +Bonus-fund revenue
DecRnk
i,t
+CIRDecRnki,t +Manager ownership
DecRnk
i,t )/6. (1)
The cooperative incentives index is also aggregated at the management company-
year level using the other six variables described above. These variables include Team
fund, Managers/Funds ratio, and Manager connected constructed from the Morningstar
manager history data; Bonus-paid in advisor equity and Bonus-advisor level determinant
hand collected from the SAI data; and the Other funds fee taken from the N-SAR data.
With these variables, the cooperative incentives index is computed in the same manner
as the competition index:
Cooperationi,t = (Team fund
DecRnk
i,t +Managers/Fund ratio
DecRnk
i,t
+Manager connectedDecRnki,t +Bonus-paid advisor equity
DecRnk
i,t
+Bonus-advisor level determinantsDecRnki,t +Other funds fee
DecRnk
i,t )/6. (2)
The values of both Competitionit and Cooperationit are standardized annually (with
zero mean and standard deviation of one) to isolate the cross-sectional differences of the
competitive and cooperative incentives schemes across investment advisors.10 Finally,
we also calculate the net incentive as the difference between the competitive and cooper-
ative incentives (Net competitive), as fund families can have elements of both incentive
structures in place, but our focus is their overall incentive environment.11
10While in this paper we abstract from the time-series variation of the incentive measures by ranking
the components within each cross-section, the time-series variation of the net competition measures
constructed using the individual versus team-fund management variables and manager compensation
components of the index are separately plotted in Fig. A1 of the Internet Appendix.
11To ensure robustness, we repeat the primary regressions in the paper constructing the indices a
variety of ways. In Table A5 of the Internet Appendix, we repeat the analysis using only the domestic
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2.2. Summary statistics: competitive versus cooperative families
In Table 1 we present the fund-level averages of the variables that comprise the index.
Because the management fee structure of the average fund is concave (i.e., the advisory
fee decreases as the total assets increase), the average CIR is negative. In terms of the
fund management structure, on average, 41% of funds are managed individually, 59%
are team-managed funds, and the average number of managers per fund is 2.74. The
Manager connected variable shows that there is just under 16% manager overlap, on
average, across funds offered by the same advisor in the same investment objective. In
terms of compensation, the managers of 83% of funds receive a bonus based in part on
fund performance, 14% based on fund revenue, and 31% based on various advisor-level
determinants, while only 8% of fund fees are based on the performance of other funds.
This compensation is paid in part via grants of fund shares for managers of 4% of funds
and via equity in the advisor for 73%. Last of all, the average ownership of managers
is 2.5, which corresponds to ownership between the $1-$10,000 and $10,001-$50,000
categories.
[Insert Table 1 here]
In Table 1 we also present the correlation matrix between the competition and co-
operation variables used to construct the indices. While the average correlation and
the majority of correlations are positive within the six competitive and six cooperative
incentive component subgroups, and the average cross-correlations and the majority
of cross-correlations across the competitive and cooperative components are negative,
there are positively correlated competitive and cooperative index components. The use
of bonuses based on fund performance and bonuses paid in advisor equity, for example,
are positively correlated. While Ma, Tang, Gomez (2018) do not distinguish between
the competitive and cooperative nature of manager incentives, they also find that many
advisors use both of these incentives. Because the different incentive mechanisms can
be used as complements or substitutes, combining them into a single index will give a
equity funds of an advisor to construct the index (Panel A), TNA-weighting (Panel B), and equal-
weighting (Panel C) the components. We also construct the index using the decile ranking procedure
from above but calculating those ranks within investment objective (Panel D). Last of all, we use the
first three components of a principal components analysis of the cooperative (Panel E) and competitive
(Panel F) incentive measures as an alternative index construction. The results are broadly consistent
across all of these different approaches to index construction.
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better sense of overall incentive environment at the advisor. In spite of the low corre-
lations among many of the components, we find that after aggregating these different
components into our competitive and cooperative indices, the correlation between the
two is -0.54 and strongly statistically significant. This serves as a point of validation
for the index construction approach: in spite of the low correlations between individ-
ual components, when aggregating them, those advisors with strong (weak) competitive
incentives, on average, have weak (strong) cooperative incentives.
Table 2 compares the fund (Panel A) and family (Panel B) characteristics of compet-
itive and cooperative families. In this table, funds are classified as being in a competitive
or cooperative family if their families score above or below the median net competition
index value. Looking at the fund results first, we see that funds with competitive in-
centives are older and perform better. This is consistent with longer survival rates for
competitively incentivized funds and competitive incentives engendering greater effort
from managers and/or attracting greater managerial talent. Funds with cooperative in-
centives are more likely to be sold through a broker-distribution channel as we see from
their higher sales loads. In terms of the cross-sectional variation in incentive schemes be-
tween investment advisors (Panel B), cooperative firms are larger and offer more funds.
Competitive advisors tend to have higher cash levels, higher expense ratios, and a higher
percentage of star funds.
[Insert Table 2 here]
3. Incentives and family level outcomes
In this section, we examine the relation between family-level outcomes of competitive
incentives (performance and dispersion) and cooperative incentives (family revenue and
cash flow volatility). In Section 3.1, we look at average fund performance, the percentage
of star funds in a family, and performance dispersion across funds in the same family. In
Section 3.2, we present results on family-wide advisory revenue volatility for the whole
sample and cash flow and return on assets volatility for a subsample of advisors that are
publicly traded.
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3.1. Performance
Given the central role that performance competition plays in the asset management
industry, we begin our analysis by analyzing the relation between competitive incentives
and fund performance. We first test at the individual fund level whether the incentive dif-
ferences affect the fund’s gross investment objective-adjusted performance and whether
net competitive fund families have a higher fraction of star funds. In Table 3, we look at
the relation between competitive and cooperative incentives and the objective-adjusted
gross performance across individual active funds in the family. The regressions are run
using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) methodology with standard errors adjusted for serial
correlation using Newey-West (1987). As the results show, performance and competitive
incentives are positively related: funds with higher competitive incentives outperform
other active funds by 1.9 basis points per month or 23 basis points per year for every
one standard deviation increase in the competitive index without fund-level controls and
1.7 basis points per month with fund-level controls. We find similar results when we
repeat the analysis with net returns (Table A6 in the Internet Appendix) or using the
stock selection (CS), the timing measure (CT), or combined into the overall DGTW
risk-adjusted performance measures of Daniel et al. (1997), the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) alpha measure of Jensen (1968), and the four-factor alpha measure of
Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (1992) (See Table A7 in the Internet Appendix).
[Insert Table 3 here]
In Table 4 we measure the relation between incentives and the fraction of star funds
in the family. We measure star funds as those portfolios with past three-year cumulative
investment objective-adjusted gross returns in the 95th percentile or greater, within their
investment style in a given month. We see that a one standard deviation increase in
competition translates into about 1.9% more star funds in the family without family
controls and 1.7% including controls. Cooperative incentives, on the other hand, reduce
the number of star funds. Fund families that are net competitive have 1.9% more star
funds with each one standard deviation increase in net competitive incentives. Repeating
the analysis at the fund level in a logistic specification or at a family level where we
classify families as competitive or cooperative, we confirm these results (See Tables A8
and A9 in the Internet Appendix).
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[Insert Table 4 here]
While improved performance is an important outcome of competitive incentives,
the internal capital markets literature also suggests that such incentives can result in
firm-wide distortions. Without trading coordination, information sharing, and other
forms of cooperation that competitive incentives may discourage, we would expect big-
ger differences in performance between funds or, effectively, greater dispersion in fund
performance outcomes. Table 5 reports regression results of the monthly cross-sectional
standard deviation of fund style-adjusted returns across all funds in the family on the
competitive, cooperative, and net competitive indices and controls. We find that more
competitive families have higher cross-sectional dispersion in performance, whereas coop-
erative incentives translate into lower dispersion. We also show that the net competitive
incentive schemes are positively associated with performance dispersion at the fund fam-
ily level. A single unit increase in the Net competitive index is associated with about
0.04% greater dispersion in performance with family-level controls. Using above median
indicator variables for competitive and cooperative families, we observe 0.056% greater
dispersion for competitive families, which represents about 5% of the average dispersion
(see Table A10 of the Internet Appendix).
[Insert Table 5 here]
Overall, we find that advisors with greater competitive incentives offer funds with
higher average performance and a higher percentage of star funds. At the same time,
consistent with a lack of coordination, the dispersion in performance across funds within
an advisor with competitive incentives is higher as well.
3.2. Fund family revenue and cash flow volatility
Given the higher fund performance and larger percentage of star funds associated
with competitive incentives, why might an investment advisor choose a cooperative
incentive scheme? The internal capital markets insights of Williamson (1975), Stein
(1997), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) shows that
the firm-value improving benefits of internal capital markets occur under a cooperative
incentive scheme. Such a scheme aligns the incentives of the division manager with those
of the CEO or firm headquarters. If the objective is to maximize the overall value of the
16
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986304 
investment advisor, coordinated action among fund managers may be an important tool
to accomplish this objective. In this section, we explore the implications of cooperative
and competitive incentives for firm-wide cash flows. We first use advisor revenue as
a proxy for such cash flows across the whole sample. We then focus on the subset of
publicly traded investment advisors, using their accounting disclosures to examine cash
flow and return on assets volatility.
In Table 6 we measure the relation between the volatility of advisor revenues and
competitive/cooperative incentives controlling for family size and other family-level char-
acteristics. The advisory fee revenue data is collected from question 72.F of each fund’s
N-SAR filing and is then aggregated across the family. The dependent variable is the
volatility of these advisory fees calculated over the previous 24 months. Consistent with
the coinsurance effects suggested by Hann, Ogneva, and Ozbas (2013), we find that com-
petitive incentives are associated with higher volatility in family revenue over time, while
cooperative incentives are associated with lower volatility. In Table A11 of the Internet
Appendix, we repeat the analysis using the flow recapture framework of Christoffersen,
Evans, and Musto (2013). There we find that advisors with competitive incentives are
worse at recapturing outflows from other funds, but consistent with greater coordination
and cooperation across the enterprise, advisors with cooperative incentives are better at
retaining assets.
[Insert Table 6 here]
While advisor revenue is a proxy for firm-level cash flows, ideally we would prefer
to analyze firm cash flows and the return on assets, directly. While many investment
advisors are privately held and therefore do not disclose this information, there is a
subset of asset management companies that are publicly held. This subsample gives us
a unique opportunity to look at how portfolio management incentives affect the stability
of the sponsor’s overall cash flows.
To identify publicly traded advisors, we use a methodology similar to that employed
by Sialm and Tham (2016), Kosovetsky (2016), and Zambrana (2017). We begin by
obtaining the names of management companies and their corresponding management
codes from the CRSP mutual fund database. To take into account mergers affecting fund
advisors or their parent companies, we search for each advisor’s name into the SEC’s
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Investment Advisor Public Disclosure (IAPD) online database and look up the Schedule
A of Form ADV, which lists all direct owners and executive officers. We also extract a
list of mergers from the SDC Platinum database and assign the family to the merged
companies after the effective date of the mergers. Using these names, we manually search
through the CRSP stock database to find the CUSIPs of the corresponding publicly
traded stocks. Using the matched CUSIPs, we obtain accounting data for management
companies or their publicly-traded parent companies (if the management company is a
subsidiary) from Compustat. Overall, our publicly traded fund management companies
sample includes 111 fund families that were offering funds during 1992 and 2015. These
publicly traded fund families account for 12% of asset managers in the mutual fund
sector.
In Table 7, we examine the stability of cash flows and return on assets of publicly-
traded asset management companies. We show that the parent companies of more
competitive advisors have more volatile cash flows and return on assets (ROA), while
we observe a negative relation for more cooperative families.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Taken as a whole, the fund performance, star fund, dispersion, and cash flow results
form a holistic picture of the use of competitive and cooperative incentives. Cooperative
incentives align fund manager incentives with those of the firm. With such incentives
in place, fund managers are more willing to sacrifice the performance of their own fund
to support other funds in the family that is of strategic importance. Consistent with
the insights of Williamson (1975) and Stein (1997) on the bright side of internal capital
markets, the overall impact is greater cash flow stability. On the other hand, competitive
incentives encourage individualistic fund manager behavior. Consistent with the firm-
wide distortion suggested by the models of Scharfstein and Stein (2000), and Rajan,
Servaes, and Zingales (2000), performance dispersion across funds in the family is higher.
At the same time, we also find that competitive incentives result in higher average
performance consistent with either incentivizing greater effort on the part of managers
or attracting managers with higher ability. This provides a novel insight relative to the
internal capital markets literature. Across the different incentive mechanisms in Stein
(1997), Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000), the overall
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surplus is split differently across the different parties, but if competitive incentives are
effective, the level or amount of that surplus may increase due to increased effort on the
part of managers.
4. Fund family incentive structure: mechanism evidence
In this section, we turn from the family-level outcome evidence to an examination of
possible mechanisms for our performance and cash flow stability results. In particular,
we test whether or not cooperative incentives are associated with increased coordina-
tion (i.e., cross-trading and cross-holding) across funds and whether or not competitive
incentives are associated with greater effort on the part of the individual fund managers.
4.1. Manager effort
If managers in competitive families have the potential for greater compensation re-
lated to the performance of their own fund and their own investment decisions managing
that fund, this could engender greater effort on the part of the manager, and/or it could
attract managers with greater ability. Consistent with this idea, Kacperczyk and Seru
(2015) look at the impact of centralization or decentralization of the research function
at the investment advisor and find those managers with greater autonomy in decision-
making outperform. This outperformance could be due to an increase in managerial
effort, with greater autonomy enabling superior managers to add more value through
their decisions, or it may be due to the desire of superior managers to work for advisors
with a more decentralized research structure. We conduct a similar analysis, looking at
the relation between competitive and cooperative incentives and manager effort.
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Amihud and Goyenko (2013) both find that man-
agers who deviate more from their benchmark outperform. Using measures of manager
deviation from a benchmark (active share and tracking error) as a proxy for manager
effort, we examine the relation between incentives and these measures.12 Table 8 reports
the results of a Fama-Macbeth regression of active share and tracking error on our in-
centive indices. We include additional controls to account for fund-level heterogeneity
such as fund size, fund age, expense ratio, turnover, flows, family size, and the number
12We thank Martijn Cremers for making the data available through his website.
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of funds held in the family. We also include style and time fixed effects to account for
systematic differences in style.
[Insert Table 8 here]
We see from the results in Table 8 that competitive incentives correlate positively
with higher active share and tracking error, our proxies for manager effort. A one stan-
dard deviation increase in net competitive incentives is associated with an increase in
active share and tracking error of 1.5% and 0.4%, respectively. Similarly, cooperative
incentives are associated with lower active share and tracking error. Given the evidence
in Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Amihud and Goyenko (2013) that manager de-
viation from a benchmark is associated with higher performance, these results suggest
a possible mechanism through which competitive incentives materialize into higher av-
erage performance across the family, namely greater effort or skill on the part of fund
managers.
4.2. Intra-family coordination
4.2.1. Cross-trading
Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) propose one way in which mutual fund families can
transfer performance across member funds: “cross-fund subsidization.” Their proposed
mechanism involves funds with the lower expected contribution to family profits cross-
trading with those funds with a higher expected contribution to family profits, selling
below or buying above market prices.13 Whether cross-trading is beneficial for the end
investor or not, it is a clear example of coordinated action taking place at the fund
family level.
To determine whether cooperative fund families are more likely to have intra-family
coordinated trades, we estimate cross-trading as the dollar amount of all buy and sell
trades of a particular stock that appear to be crossed within a family (Cross-trades).
Using the equity holdings data from CRSP between 2004 and 2015, we identify those
stocks that are purchased and sold by different funds in the same family in the same
13Eisele et al. (2017) find that the latter motivation only prevails before the late-trading scandal
in 2003 when monitoring was weak and cross-trading decreases transaction costs when monitoring is
strong.
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month and in the same quantity (the buy and sell volume of stock is exactly equal).14
We then aggregate up the dollar volume of these crossed trades to a quarterly level and
divide by the total family equity trading volume. We also construct a “style-adjusted”
version of our cross-trading measure where we further require that the exact trade-
crossing occurs between two funds within the same investment objective to control for
mechanical switches between styles (e.g., when a growth stock becomes a value stock).
We also use data on investment advisors contained in the uniform application for
investment advisor registration (form ADV) similar to Casavecchia and Tiwari (2016).
The SEC requires fund advisors to disclose their agency cross-trading practices. Using
historical ADV data from 2001 to 2015, we collect investment advisory firms’ answers to
item 8, section B of the form. In agency cross-trading, an advisor (or its affiliated bro-
ker), acting as agent, arranges off-market transactions between different advisory clients
or between a brokerage customer and an advisory client. Because this self-reported ADV
measure is required disclosure by the SEC, it should be reasonably accurate and com-
plete, avoiding the need to infer cross-trading from holdings or trade data. Moreover,
Del Guercio, Genc¸, and Tran (2017) find a positive and significant correlation between
the cross-trade measure from the ADV form and the Ancerno transaction-level data from
Ben-Rephael and Israelsen (2015). The Agency cross-trading variable is the percentage
of affirmative answers to questions 1 to 3 of Item 8, Section b.
Table 9 reports the cross-trading regression results. The first two columns report
the results for our holdings-based cross-trading measures. The last column reports the
results for our form ADV-based cross-trading measures. The same set of control vari-
ables used in previous regressions are included in the regression, but coefficients are
omitted to accommodate the formatting of the table. Across all specifications, we find
strong evidence that competitive incentives are associated with less cross-trading, while
cooperative incentives are associated with more cross-trading. Looking at the most
conservative holdings-based cross-trading measure, style-adjusted, we see that a one
standard deviation increase in competitive incentives decreases cross-trading by 1.6%,
and a one standard deviation increase in cooperative incentives increases cross-trading
by around 1.5%.
14In this analysis, we use the CRSP holdings data, as opposed to Thompson, due to the higher
percentage of funds reporting monthly. Requiring the buy/sell trade quantity to match exactly and
using monthly as opposed to quarterly timing helps to more accurately identify cross-trading activity.
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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[Insert Table 9 here]
4.2.2. Cross-holding
Bhattacharya, Lee, and Pool (2013) provide evidence of an alternative way in which
coordination or cross-subsidization can take place within fund families. They show that
fund families use their affiliated fund-of-mutual funds to provide liquidity to offset liquid-
ity shortfalls of other funds in the family. This direct capital injection from one fund in
the family to another fund that is facing large redemptions results in performance trans-
fer from the supporting fund to the liquidity constrained fund. To determine whether
there is a positive relation between cooperation within a family and the level of direct
liquidity support in the form of funds holding other siblings in the family, we run a
fund-level logistic regression to determine the likelihood of purchasing shares in another
fund in the family in times of distress. We define distress as outflows larger than 5%
during the quarter.
The results of our cross-holding analysis are shown in Table 10. The independent
variables of interest include a distress indicator, the incentive indices, and the interac-
tion between the two in addition to the standard set of controls. The table reports odds
ratios instead of coefficients. Looking first at distress, we see that if a fund is in distress
(i.e., distress indicator = 1), we see that the probability of being cross-held by another
fund in the family increases by approximately 26%. While we see no statistically sig-
nificant effect of the incentive indices on average, for those funds in distress, a one unit
increase in competitive (cooperative) incentives corresponds to a 9.1% decrease (9.4%
increase) in the probability of being cross-held. To ensure that these results are not
driven mechanically by rebalancing on the part of the cross-holding fund, we repeat the
analysis with investment objective-time fixed effects (Style*Time) in the last three spec-
ifications. If the economic drivers underlying rebalancing decisions in balanced or asset
allocation funds (e.g., a decrease in overall equity valuation relative to fixed income in
early 2009 results in rebalancing toward equities) are correlated, investment objective-
time fixed effects will absorb this common rebalancing motive. Including these fixed
effects, however, does not materially affect the results.
[Insert Table 10 here]
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While cross-trading and cross-holding are two prominent examples from the literature
of coordinated behavior, there are a number of alternative measures of coordination. In
Table A12 of the Internet Appendix, we also examine the relation between incentives and
other proxies of coordinated behavior specifically focused on information sharing across
the family. The first of these proxies (Cross assets trading) measures the ownership of
stocks and bonds issued by the same corporation by stock and bond funds belonging
to the same investment advisor. The second (Stock weight % fund) and third (Stock
weight % assets) proxies measure ownership of the same stock across different funds
of the same advisor. The last proxy (Adopt time) measures the speed of information
diffusion within a family. Namely, when one fund in a family invests in a new stock, how
quickly do other funds offered by the same advisor invest in the new security? Across
these different measures, we would expect greater information sharing due to higher
cooperative incentives to increase common ownership/overlap and decrease adoption
time, and this is what we find.
Overall, we find strong evidence that cooperative incentives translate into coordi-
nated action across the investment advisor. This evidence on coordinated action across
funds in the family provides insight into potential mechanisms for the more stable cash
flows that we observe in families with cooperative incentives.
5. Fund family incentive structure: clientele and distribution channel
While our analysis of performance, dispersion, and cash flow volatility gives addi-
tional insight into the strategic implications of an investment advisor’s use of competitive
or cooperative incentives, the choice between these different incentive mechanisms is not
made in isolation and may be related to other aspects of the investment advisor’s busi-
ness. The literature points to two additional strategic dimensions that may complement
the investment advisor’s choice of incentive scheme: investor clientele and fund distri-
bution channel.
Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2018) model the equilibrium choice of investors to directly
invest or to use an asset manager to invest on their behalf. They find that institutional
investors (i.e., investors with lower search costs relative to their assets to be invested)
benefit from searching for informed managers. Considering our results in the context
of their model, we posit that competitive investment advisors are more likely to have
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institutional clients. If cross-subsidization and resource sharing across funds results in
the transfer of performance, these activities have the potential to obscure the perfor-
mance signal that institutional investors use to identify managers. In contrast, because
managers in a competitive investment advisor are less willing to collaborate, the perfor-
mance signal in these families would be clearer. Moreover, since institutional investors
have lower search costs and greater ability to discern talented managers, the competitive
compensation model would be more suitable for investment advisors hoping to attract
institutional assets. At the same time, for retail investors who are less able to discern
manager skill, as posited in the assumptions of their model, the greater dispersion in
fund performance across funds managed by competitive advisors would result in greater
investment risk.
Related to the clientele evidence above, Del Guercio and Reuter (2014) show that
the market for retail funds is segmented, catering to two distinct clienteles based on
the distribution channel. They find that investors who purchase funds sold through the
broker channel are less sensitive to performance and appear less sophisticated in their
investment decisions. Given our earlier evidence that funds from families with net co-
operative incentives underperform, the family’s decision to utilize cooperative incentives
may be complemented by selling through a broker-distribution channel to access less
sophisticated investors who have preferences over non-performance fund characteristics,
whereas competitive fund families would be more likely to be direct sold funds.
To assess the possible relation between incentives, clientele, and distribution channel,
we regress our proxies for clientele and distribution on the competition indices. The
results are given in Table 11. As our measure of institutional clientele, we identify those
investment advisors that manage both mutual funds and hedge funds using the side-
by-side indicator employed by Del Guercio, Genc¸, and Tran (2017). To proxy for the
distribution channel, we use the proportion of assets under management in the family
that is sold without a load fee in a family.
While our previous analysis uses the competitive and cooperative indices as explana-
tory variables, in this specification the dependent variable is the average family index
level of these incentives.15 As the results show, both direct distribution and institu-
tional clientele, as proxied for by our side-by-side indicator variable, are associated with
15Because the side-by-side proxy for institutional clientele is only available for a subset of our sample,
we analyze the institutional clientele and distribution channel results as separate specifications.
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stronger net competitive incentives both with or without family-level controls.
[Insert Table 11 here]
6. Robustness
While our results show a strong relation between family incentives and fund/family
behavior, it is possible that these behaviors are being driven by an omitted variable,
subject to simultaneous causality or some other source of endogeneity. To address these
concerns, we use a quasi-experimental design focused on M&A activity among advisors
and a falsification test with random assignment of fund families as a whole. The M&A
setting provides a plausibly exogenous shock to the incentive structure of a fund, as
target funds become subject to the incentives of the acquirer post-acquisition. In this
setting, we revisit the fund-level mechanism evidence in Section 5.. The falsification test,
on the other hand, allows us to determine whether or not fund family-level outcomes
and coordination behavior are mechanically driven by family structure and size.
6.1. Investment advisor mergers and acquisitions
We examine mergers and acquisitions in the asset management industry in a quasi-
experimental design.16 Specifically, we use the difference in incentives between the ac-
quirer and target family Net competitive index in the year before the merger as a plausi-
bly exogenous shock to managerial incentives of target funds. We then examine how this
shock to managerial incentives of the target fund relates to the active share, tracking
error, cross-trading, and cross-holding of the fund. One important advantage of this
setting is that the manager, investment strategy, and other fund characteristics are held
constant across the acquisition date, so we can be more confident that any change in
the fund-outcome variables is due to changes in the incentive environment.
16To identify possible investment advisor mergers, we examine two different sources. First, the N-
SAR filings require investment company registrants to identify “Changes in control” (question 77.H).
We use an affirmative response to this item as a possible indicator of investment advisor merger. Second,
the investment advisor registration statement (form ADV) identifies “Control persons” (Item 10). We
identify the subset of form ADV registrants who manage discretionary assets (Part 1, Item 5.F.(2).(a))
and have investment company/mutual fund assets (Part 1, Item 5.D.(1-3).(d)). Within that subset,
we then identify those investment advisors who have a change in their stated “Control persons” as a
possible merger candidate. With possible mergers from these two sources, we then search newspapers,
magazines, industry periodicals, press releases, and other popular media sources to confirm the merger
and to identify the merger date.
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To eliminate any concern about possible ex-ante differences between the sample of
acquired funds and those funds whose investment advisor is not acquired, we limit our
analysis to acquired funds. Instead of the standard bivariate treatment/control frame-
work commonly used in financial economics, we focus on variation in “dosing” across our
treatment sample for identification. Because there is wide variation in the differences in
incentives between acquiring and target investment advisors (i.e., competitive advisors
acquire cooperative targets and vice versa), we include this difference in incentives as a
continuous variable in our analysis. While the median difference in the net competitive
incentive indices is 0.057, indicating that, on average, the acquirer has more competitive
incentives than the target, 37.1% of the target funds in our M&A subsample have more
competitive incentives than their acquirer before the acquisition, while 62.9% have more
cooperative incentives. Additionally, we find that the difference in incentives between
the acquirer and the target at t-12 is a strong predictor (coefficient of 0.824 with a t-
statistic of over 10) of the change in incentives of the target fund from the month before
the acquisition (t-1 ) to 12 months after the acquisition (t+12 ).
In Table 12 we show the results. The dependent variables are active share, tracking
error, cross-trading, and cross-holdings. In addition to the standard fund and family
controls, the specification also includes fund and time fixed effects absorbing any unob-
servable fund-specific effects or any time-series variation that may have otherwise affected
our results. We include an indicator variable for the post-merger period (Post-event),
and we interact the dosage variable, (∆Netcompetition) with this post-event period.
Consistent with our previous results, Table 12 shows that an increase in net competitive
incentives for acquired funds is associated with higher active share and tracking error,
but a lower incidence of cross-trading and cross-holding post-acquisition. In addition
to addressing concerns about alternative causality, the active share and tracking error
results help to clarify the potential mechanism through which incentives affect fam-
ily outcomes. In our earlier results, we cannot identify whether increased competitive
incentives increase performance through higher manager effort or attracting superior
managers. Because we are holding the manager constant across the acquisition period,
the increase in active share and tracking error in Table 12 is due to increased manager
effort in this subsample.
[Insert Table 12 here]
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6.2. Placebo test: pseudo fund families
In Table 2, we find that cooperative families are larger, on average, than competitive
families. If larger families offer a greater number of funds across a greater number
of investment objectives, one specific endogeneity concern is that our finding of more
cross-trading or cross-holding is not necessarily due to the incentive structure in place
but rather the family characteristics. To address this concern, we include the size of
the families, the number of funds, and the number of stocks held as control variables
in our regressions. As an additional robustness check to rule out that the results are
mechanically driven by the size or structure of fund families, we run a falsification test.
For each family in each month, we create a control family with the same number
of funds and the same structure in terms of size and investment style distribution by
randomly selecting matched funds from other families. More precisely, a family with N
funds each with a certain investment style and from a given fund size decile is matched
to N funds outside the family from the same styles and fund size deciles on a random
basis. Through this matching, this pseudo family has the same number of funds from the
same investment objectives and very similar TNA managed as the original family. This
way, we have plausibly kept the family characteristics the same, while randomizing on
the competition and cooperation incentives, within the matched families. These pseudo-
families create a benchmark for our fund family coordination outcomes under the null
of no cooperation or competition.
Table 13 shows the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation of the effect of competitive
and cooperative incentives on pseudo fund family outcomes. While the robustness check
in Table 12 focused on fund-level outcomes, the family-level nature of this analysis
necessitates a focus on family-level outcomes. If cross-trading and cross-holding are
not conscious decisions made by managers motivated by their incentives, but rather
mechanically arise from simply being a large fund family, then we would expect to see
that the pseudo families, constructed upon randomly assigned funds matched by style
and size, exhibit similar levels of cross-subsidization. Similarly, the pseudo test helps to
rule out that the large family structure mechanically influences our performance results.
However, as can be seen from the table in these random families, there seems to be
no statistically significant evidence of family performance, dispersion, cross-trading, and
cross-holding activity. The net competitive indices constructed across these randomly
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assigned family affiliations are not significantly related to these activities. These results
suggest that our family-level outcome results are driven by incentives and coordination
choices made at the family level and not spurious family characteristics.
[Insert Table 13 here]
6.3. Additional robustness
In addition to our M&A and falsification tests, we also run a number of additional
robustness checks to rule out specific endogeneity concerns. For example, the incentive
structure of financial conglomerates might be different from specialized mutual funds.
To show that our results are not driven by financial conglomerate ownership, we repeat
our principal regressions controlling for ownership of an investment advisor by a financial
conglomerate in Table A13 in the Internet Appendix. Net competitive incentives are
similarly positively related to performance, dispersion, and effort and negatively related
to cross-trades as in our main sample and do not seem to be affected by conglomerate
ownership, as the interaction between the net competitive index and the conglomerative
indicator variable is not statistically significant.
In Table A4 of the Internet Appendix, we show various sample splits to illustrate the
results are not driven by certain family characteristics or by time period. Our results
remain virtually unchanged when we run the main analysis on families with focused
styles, large families only, and families with shrinking or growing assets. Our results
persist among families with low or high fees and across the sample period 2005-2015
including and excluding the financial crisis.
In Table A5 in the Internet Appendix, we vary the construction of our three indices,
cooperative, competitive, and net competitive, to show that our results are robust to
the way we measure incentives. In Panel A of table A5 of the Internet Appendix, we
construct our indices using only equity funds; Panel B creates the indices using a TNA-
weighted average of the fund characteristics as opposed to an equal weight; and in Panel
C we give the individual subcomponents of the index equal weight. We rank components
by investment objective to rule out differences in among fund families portfolio of fund
styles driving the results (Panel D). In Panels E and F we run a principal components
analysis (PCA) of the cooperative and competitive incentive index components. Using
the first three components of each PCA analysis to construct the indices, we repeat the
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analysis with very similar results. Overall, the results suggest that our conclusions are
not sensitive to how we construct the index.
7. Conclusion
Asset management is a highly competitive industry where human capital is the prin-
cipal asset. Because that human capital can easily move from one firm to another, the
compensation strategy to attract and retain fund managers is a key decision in operating
a successful investment advisory firm. Given the dual goal of retaining good managers
and maximizing fund performance, incentivizing fund managers to generate outperfor-
mance in the funds they manage may seem, on the surface, like a reasonable approach.
Such incentives would generate competition among fund managers both within and out-
side the firm. At the same time, if the goal is maximizing the overall value of the
investment advisor, encouraging cooperation among fund managers in the family may
be a superior incentive scheme. Our analysis helps to identify the impact of these two
different compensation approaches and the characteristics of investment advisors who
choose cooperative or competitive incentive schemes.
We develop measures of the firm’s cooperative and competitive incentives and find
cross-sectional variation in the incentive structure of fund families, where some invest-
ment advisors have (net) competitive incentives, while other investment advisors have
cooperative incentives. This distinction between competitive and cooperative incentives
has important implications for fund managers. Families that have more cooperative in-
centives and labor markets are more likely to engage in coordination/cross-subsidization
as measured by cross-holding and cross-trading and have more stable cash flows over
time. Families that are more competitive in nature have higher fund performance and a
higher fraction of star performers, but they have higher variation in performance among
funds in the same family.
These two different incentive mechanisms are also associated with other aspects of
firm strategy, namely distribution channel and clientele. Consistent with the insights of
Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2018), competitive advisors are more likely to manage institu-
tional assets and have their funds distributed directly to investors. Cooperative families,
on the other hand, are more likely to manage retail investor assets and to have their
fund offerings marketed through a broker-distribution channel, consistent with investor
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demand for nonperformance characteristics.
When we repeat these analyses using investment advisor acquisitions as a shock to the
incentive structure of acquired funds, we observe that funds acquired by advisors with
more competitive incentives than they have previously experienced exhibit an increase
in managerial effort and a decrease in cooperation. We also randomly assign families
as a falsification test, and the results suggest our family-level outcomes do not arise
mechanically from family characteristics.
In understanding what drives the distinction between families who choose coopera-
tive incentives versus those who choose competitive incentives, the literature on “internal
capital markets” provides an important framework. Thinking of an investment advisor
as “the firm” and each fund manager as a “division manager,” the mutual fund industry
provides a unique setting in which to examine the workings of internal capital markets.
Consistent with the insights of Williamson (1975) and Stein (1997) on the bright side
of internal capital markets, cooperative incentives align fund manager incentives with
those of the firm. Fund managers are willing to sacrifice the performance of their own
fund to support other funds in the family that are of strategic importance. The overall
result is greater cash flow stability. Our results are also consistent with the insights of
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) on the dark side
of internal capital markets. Competitive incentives appear to encourage individualis-
tic fund/division manager behavior that is associated with greater dispersion in fund
outcomes.
Our paper also adds an important insight to this internal capital markets litera-
ture. Across the different incentive mechanisms in Stein (1997), Scharfstein and Stein
(2000), and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), the overall surplus is split differently
across the different parties, but the level or amount of that surplus is unchanged. We
find that competitive incentives result in higher average performance consistent with
either incentivizing greater effort on the part of managers or attracting managers with
higher ability. While the lack of coordination between the objectives of these higher
effort/higher skill managers and the investment advisor may still result in the dark side
of internal capital markets, those negative effects must be weighed against higher overall
performance in our context, or a larger overall surplus in the context of a more general
internal capital markets literature. Overall, our paper yields important insights into the
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specific economics of the asset management industry and more general insights into the
theory of the firm.
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Data appendix: Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Index variables
CIR measure Based on question 48 from the N-SAR, we take the difference between the last and first marginal compensation
rates divided by the effective marginal compensation rate (see Massa and Patgiri, 2009).
Individual Fund The proportion of funds within a family that are managed by an individual fund manager.
Manager ownership Morningstar’s ownership range based on the portfolio managers ownership data reported to the SEC. Portfolio
manager ownership falls in one of the following seven ranges: $0 (none), $1-$10,000, $10,001-$50,000, $50,001-
$100,000, $100,001-$500,000, $500,001-$1,000,000, and above $1,000,000.
Bonus-fund performance Manager-level compensation indicator variables from the fund’s SAI filings of whether or not the manager’s
compensation is based on the specific fund’s performance.
Bonus-paid in fund shares Manager-level compensation indicator variables from the fund’s SAI filings of whether the manager compensation
includes shares from the fund.
Bonus-fund revenue Manager-level compensation indicator variables from the fund’s SAI filings of whether the manager compensation
is linked to the revenues collected by the fund.
Other funds fee Fund advisory contract fee variable captures whether or not the fund’s management fee is based on the assets,
income, or performance of other registrants (question 52 N-SAR)
Team fund The proportion of funds in a family managed by a team of managers.
Manager connected This variable is defined as the number of funds that have managers in common with other funds in the family
divided by the total number of funds in the same investment objective in the family.
Managers/Funds ratio The average number of managers per fund in the family.
Bonus-paid in advisor equity Manager-level compensation indicator variables from the fund’s SAI filings of whether the manager has equity in
the advisor.
Bonus-overall advisor revenue Manager-level compensation indicator variables from the fund’s SAI filings of whether a manager’s bonus is based
on the overall profitability of the advisor.
Fund characteristics
Cash The proportion of fund’s asset invested in cash (in %).
Expense ratio Total annual expenses and fees divided by year-end TNA (in %).
Front load Maximum fund sales charge (in %).
Fund age Natural logarithm of the number of years since the fund inception date.
Fund flows The net growth in fund assets beyond reinvested dividends (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) over the past one year.
Fund ranking revenues Cross-sectional decile rank of fund’s contribution to total fund family revenues. Revenues is calculated as assets
under management times fee.
Fund size Natural logarithm of TNA (total net assets) under management (in US $m).
Fund turnover Minimum of aggregate purchases and sales of securities divided by average TNA over the calendar year.
Gross returns Monthly portfolio gross return (in %).
Gross performance Portfolio gross return minus the median value of the return of all the funds within the same investment objective.
Manager tenure Natural logarithm of the number of years since the fund manager started working for the fund family.
Past return The cumulative fund return, computed over a trailing 12-month window.
Family characteristics
Competitive A standardized index that measures the fund family competitive incentives.
Competitive family Indicator variables for families with above median competitive incentives scheme.
Cooperative A standardized index that measures the fund family cooperative incentives.
Cooperative family Indicator variables for families with above median cooperative incentives scheme.
Cross-holding The dollar amount of funds held by other funds in the family as a fraction of total assets managed by the firm.
Fund cross-holding The dollar amount of funds held by other funds in the family as a fraction of total assets managed by the fund.
SEC form ADV Cross-trading The percentage of affirmative answers to questions 1 to 3 of Section B of Item 8 form ADV.
Holding-based cross-trades The dollar amount of all buy and sell trades of a particular stock that gets offset within a family in a given
quarter as a fraction of total family trading volume using the equity holdings data from CRSP between 2010 and
2015. Then we take an equal-weighted average of this measure across all stocks in the entire family portfolio.
Cross-trades (style adjusted) as the dollar amount of all buy and sell trades of a particular stock that gets offset within a family in a given
quarter as a fraction of total family trading volume using the equity holdings data from CRSP within investment
objective between 2010 and 2015. Then we take an equal-weighted average of this measure across all stocks in
the entire family portfolio.
Cross-asset trading We use the CRSP holdings data as of 2010 that has both equity and bond holdings information to construct a
variable that captures the average frequency in which both equity and bond funds simultaneously hold a security
of the same firm as a fraction of the total number of holdings in the asset management company.
Stock weight % funds The average across all stocks in family of the number of portfolios holding a stock over the number of portfolios
in the family, with competitive incentives.
Stock weight % assets A Herfindahl index of the fund family holdings; more precisely, its the sum of the squares of the portfolio holdings
within a fund family weighted by the total family holdings size.
Continued on next page
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– continued from previous page
Variable Definition
Adopt time The average across funds in the family of the time lapsed in quarters between the initiation of the position (the
date the first fund in the family purchased the stock over the past year) and when other funds in the family also
purchased the stock.
Family age Natural logarithm of the number of years since the fund family issued the first fund.
Family cash The family average of fund’s asset invested in cash.
Family expense ratio The family average of total funds expense ratio.
Family front load The family average of funds sales charges.
Family funds Natural logarithm of the number of funds within the fund family.
Family gross return The family average of fund before-fee returns.
Family performance (Gross Re-
turns)
The family average of fund performance. Performance is measure with the gross return minus the median value
of the return of all the funds within the same investment objective.
Family size Natural logarithm of TNA of all funds in the family, excluding the fund itself.
Family star funds The total star funds in a family as a fraction of the total funds the family is currently managing.
Family stocks Natural logarithm of the number of stocks held within the fund family.
Family turnover The family average of individual fund turnover.
Net competitive A standardized index that measures the fund family net competitive (competitive - cooperative) incentives.
Net competitive family Indicator variables for families with above median net competitive incentives scheme.
Performance dispersion The cross-sectional standard deviation of fund performance within all the funds managed by the family in a given
period.
Direct distribution channel Proportion of family j assets under management from funds sold without a load fee.
Side-by-side An indicator variable for fund families that managed mutual funds and other pooled investment vehicles.
Parent company characteristics
Family revenue volatility Is the time-series standard devation of a family aggregate advisory revenue using the past 24-month observations.
Family advisory fee revenues are collected for each fund from their semiannual N-SAR filings and then aggregated
across all funds in the family. The dollar value of advisory revenue is then converted into a percentage using
lagged aggregate family assets as the denominator.
Cash flow volatility The standard deviation of cash-flows of the parent company, using the past 24-month observation. Cash-Flows
is the total cash standardized by lagged assets of the parent company.
Parent age The natural logarithm of the number of years since the parent company controlling the fund family was founded.
Parent leverage The total long-term debt of the parent company standardized by assets.
Parent ROA The income before extraordinary items of the parent company, as a proportion of lagged asset.
ROA volatility The standard deviation of return on assets of the parent company, using the past 24-month observation.
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Appendix: incentive indices construction example
The data used in constructing the competition and cooperation indices comes from
three different sources: Morningstar, the SAI, and the SEC semiannual report or N-
SAR. Both the competition and cooperation indices include data on whether a fund was
solo or team managed, the number of managers of a fund, and the interconnectedness
of managers across funds in a family. To construct these measures, we use the fund
manager history data from Morningstar. The manager bonus, compensation, and fund
ownership variables are given in the “Portfolio Managers” section of mutual funds’ SAI
, often under the heading “Compensation.” From the N-SAR data, we collect both the
advisory fee breakpoint data used to construct the Coles incentive rate as well as an
indicator as to whether or not the advisory fee was based on the performance, assets, or
income of other funds in the family. To clarify how the components of our cooperation
and competition indices are calculated, we discuss in detail below the 2006 raw data and
how they were coded for the Janus Fund. In every case, yes responses are coded as 1,
no responses as 0.
At the end of 2005, Blaine Rollins was the sole manager of the Janus Fund. At that
time, Morningstar classified the Janus Fund as large-cap growth, and Janus had 12 other
funds that Morningstar classified as large-cap growth. Michael served as the manager of
two of those funds. With this information, the raw value of the manager team variables
are as follows:
• Individual fund: Yes
• Team fund: No
• Managers/Fund ratio: 1
• Manager connected: 2/12
As for the manager compensation variables, the February 26, 2006, Janus SAI de-
scribes the determinants of the manager’s compensation and bonus as follows:
“A portfolio manager is compensated for managing a Fundthrough two com-
ponents: fixed compensation and variable compensation . . . . Fixed com-
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pensation is paid in cash and is comprised of an annual base salary and
an additional amount calculated based on factors such as the complexity of
managing funds and other accounts, the scope of responsibility (including
assets under management), tenure, and long-term performance as a portfolio
manager. . . . Variable compensation is paid in the form of cash and long-
term incentive awards (consisting of Janus Capital Group Inc. (“JCGI”)
restricted stock, stock options, and a cash deferred award that is credited
with income, gains, and losses based on the performance of Janus mutual
fund investments selected by the portfolio manager). . . . Variable compen-
sation is structured to pay the portfolio manager primarily on individual
performance (and leadership criteria, as applicable), with additional com-
pensation available for team performance and a lesser component based on
net asset flows in the Managed Funds. A portfolio manager’s individual
performance compensation is determined by applying a multiplier against
the portfolio manager’s fixed compensation. The multiplier is tied to the
Managed Funds’ aggregate asset-weighted Lipper peer group performance
ranking for one- and three-year performance periods, if applicable, with a
greater emphasis on three-year results. The portfolio manager is also eligible
to receive additional individual performance compensation if the Managed
Funds achieve a certain rank in their Lipper peer performance groups in each
of three, four, or five consecutive years (performance periods may be from the
commencement of a portfolio manager’s tenure managing a Fund). Equity
portfolio manager compensation is also subject to reduction in the event that
the Managed Funds incur material negative absolute performance. Portfolio
managers are not eligible to earn any individual performance compensation if
the Managed Funds’ performance does not meet or exceed a certain ranking
in their Lipper peer performance group.”
The SAI also discloses Rollin’s ownership of the Janus Fund as of October 31, 2005,
as being over $1,000,000. Based on this information, we coded the manager bonus or
compensation variables as follows:
• Bonus based on fund performance: Yes
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• Bonus paid in fund shares: No
• Bonus based on fund revenue: Yes
• Bonus based on advisor-level determinants: No
• Bonus paid in advisor equity: Yes
• Manager ownership:> $1,000,000
It is important to note that our bonus based on advisor-level determinants variable
differs from the Ma, Tang, and Gomez (2018) advisor profitability variable. While many
investment advisors indicate that the size of their bonus pool depends on the overall
profitability of the advisor, our advisor-level determinants variables focus instead on the
use of manager level effort/activity, as it relates to advisor-level activities being used to
determine a bonus. While the variable is coded as “No” in this example, consider the
following excerpt on compensation in Alliance Bernstein’s March 1, 2006, SAI to help
clarify this point:
“The Advisor’s overall profitability determines the total amount of incentive
compensation available to investment professionals. [Advisor-level profitabil-
ity] . . . In evaluating this component of an investment professional’s compen-
sation, the Advisor considers the contribution to his/her team or discipline
as it relates to that team’s overall contribution to the long-term investment
success, business results, and strategy of the Advisor. [Advisor-level deter-
minants]. . . . There are no specific formulas used to determine this part of
an investment professional’s compensation and the compensation is not tied
to any pre-determined or specified level of performance.”
The SAI excerpt notes two separate things here. First, the size of the overall bonus
pool may be affected by the performance of the advisor. Second, an individual manager’s
bonus is determined, in part, by their overall contribution to the long-term success,
business results, and strategy of the advisor. It is possible that in a given year the pool
might shrink, but if the managers contribution is large enough, that managers bonus
might grow. When we code this variable, we are looking explicitly for the latter; namely,
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the advisor uses advisor-wide (as opposed to fund-specific) manager contributions as a
determinant for the specific bonus of a given manager.
Last of all, the advisory fee breakpoints necessary to calculate the Coles incentive
rate (CIR measure) and the indication of whether or not the fund’s advisory fee was
based entirely or partially on the performance, assets, and income of other funds in
the family (Other funds fee) are both collected from the fund’s semiannual report or
N-SAR. The advisory fee breakpoints are given in question 48 of the N-SAR form, and
the dependence of each fund’s advisory fee on the performance, assets, and income of
other funds in the family is given in question 52. In May 30, 2006, N-SAR filed on June
29, 2006, we see that the fund has no breakpoints, just an effective advisory fee rate of
0.64%, across all fund sizes. With a perfectly linear advisory fee, the Coles incentive
rate or CIR is zero. Additionally, the Janus Fund’s advisory fee is not based on the
performance, assets, or income of other funds in the family.
• CIR measure: 0
• Other funds fee: No
With the raw data in hand, we average these variables across all funds in the family
and then calculate decile ranks for the family relative to other families in the cross-section
(i.e., in the same time period). We then calculate an equal-weighted average of these
ranks across all funds in the family to get a family average cooperation, competition,
and net competition measure. For 2006, below are the Janus family decile ranks across
variables:
• Individual fund: 5th decile
• Team fund: 5th decile
• Managers/Fund ratio: 3rd decile
• Manager connected: 2nd decile
• Manager bonus (based on performance): 4th decile
• Compensation in fund shares: 1st decile
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• Compensation based on fund revenues: 9th decile
• Compensation based on overall advisor profits: 1st decile
• Equity in advisor: 5th decile
• Manager ownership: 7th decile
• CIR measure: 5th decile
• Other funds fee: 1st decile
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Table 2:
Competition vs Cooperation
This table presents the mean of fund and family characteristics, according to the family
incentives to cooperate and compete, and the corresponding difference between the two
samples. Funds are classified as being in a competitive or cooperative family if their
families score above or below the median net competition index value. Standard errors
are clustered at the fund family level. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes
significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. Panel A
contains all the variables at the fund level, and Panel B summarizes the characteristics
for the whole family. Variable definitions are in Table 1 in the Appendix. The data
cover the period 1992 to 2015.
Panel A: Fund characteristics
Competitive Cooperative Difference
Fund size (log TNA) 4.981 5.682 -0.701∗∗∗
Fund age 9.525 8.933 0.592∗∗∗
Gross returns 0.702 0.659 0.043∗∗∗
Front load 0.558 0.625 -0.067∗∗∗
Cash 5.667 4.741 0.925∗∗∗
Expense ratio (%) 1.311 1.170 0.141∗∗∗
Fund turnover 0.877 1.007 -0.130∗∗∗
Gross performance 0.020 0.007 0.013∗∗
Net performance 0.007 0.006 0.001
Fund flows (monthly) 0.161 1.253 -1.092
Fund ranking revenues 5.509 5.537 -0.027∗∗∗
Average total funds 4,253
Panel B: Family characteristics
Competitive Cooperative Difference
Family size (log TNA) 6.749 9.592 -2.842∗∗∗
Family funds (log) 1.538 2.587 -1.050∗∗∗
Family age (log) 5.202 5.857 -0.655∗∗∗
Family stocks (log) 5.564 7.149 -1.585∗∗∗
Family cash 5.818 4.877 0.941∗∗∗
Family expense Ratio 1.373 1.191 0.182∗∗∗
Family turnover 0.872 0.991 -0.119∗∗∗
Family front load 0.506 0.621 -0.115∗∗∗
Family star funds 0.078 0.047 0.031∗∗∗
Average total advisors 312 239
44
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986304 
Table 3:
Fund Performance: Gross Returns
The table lists the results of following regression specification: FundPerformancei,t =
β0+β1Competitive/Cooperativej,t+controls+i,t, where FundPerformancei,t measures
the performance of fund i at time t using the objective-adjusted gross returns (before
fees). Competitive/Cooperativej,t is a standardized index that measures the fund family
j competitive and cooperative incentives at time t. We also include the Net competitive
(competitive - cooperative) effect. Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. The
constant term is included but not reported. We estimate the above model by using
the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method. The constant term is included but not reported.
The t-statistics adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) are reported in
parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5%
level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Gross performance
Competitive 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(4.19) (3.99)
Cooperative -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(-2.60) (-2.77)
Net competitive 0.019∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(3.69) (3.69)
Family size (log TNA) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(3.75) (2.71) (3.32) (2.54) (4.23) (3.06)
Family funds (log) 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004
(0.70) (0.46) (0.84) (0.62) (0.80) (0.56)
Fund size (log TNA) 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.68) (0.60) (0.62)
Expense ratio (%) 0.028 0.029 0.028
(1.32) (1.33) (1.30)
Fund turnover 0.012 0.012 0.012
(0.80) (0.80) (0.81)
Fund flows (monthly) 0.337∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗
(6.83) (6.84) (6.84)
Fund age -0.012∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.012∗∗
(-2.14) (-2.08) (-2.15)
Style dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. of observations 1,015,665 1,006,554 1,015,665 1,006,554 1,015,665 1,006,554
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.023 0.005 0.023 0.005 0.023
45
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986304 
Table 4:
Family star funds
The table lists the results of following regression specification: FamStarFundsj,t =
β0 +β1Competitive/Cooperativej,t+controls+ j,t, where FamStarFundsj,t is the pro-
portion of star funds in family j at time t. Competitive/Cooperativej,t is a standardized
index that measures the fund family j competitive and cooperative incentives at time t.
We also include the Net competitive (competitive - cooperative) effect. Variable defini-
tions are the Data Appendix. We estimate the above model by using the Fama-MacBeth
(1973) method. The constant term is included but not reported. The t-statistics ad-
justed for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) are reported in parentheses. *
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and ***
denotes significance at the 1% level.
Star funds strategy
Competitive 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(14.70) (13.66)
Cooperative -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(-8.34) (-8.86)
Net competitive 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(12.60) (12.33)
Family size (log TNA) 0.011∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(11.19) (17.01) (10.32) (16.40) (11.08) (16.85)
Family funds (log) -0.024∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(-7.55) (-9.11) (-7.75) (-9.13) (-7.45) (-8.92)
Family age (log) -0.023∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
(-14.97) (-15.92) (-15.73)
Family cash 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(5.67) (5.92) (5.65)
Family expense ratio 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(15.40) (15.00) (14.74)
Family turnover 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(2.40) (2.05) (2.27)
Family front load -0.027∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(-9.79) (-10.72) (-10.09)
Family gross return 0.353∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗
(2.87) (2.99) (2.92)
No. of observations 105,435 105,299 105,435 105,299 105,435 105,299
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.076 0.019 0.075 0.022 0.077
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Table 5:
Performance dispersion
The table lists the results of following regression specification: PerfDispj,t =
β0 + β1Competitive/Cooperativej,t + controls + j,t, where PerfDispj,t is the cross-
sectional standard deviation of objective-adjusted fund returns of family j at time t.
Competitive/Cooperativej,t is a standardized index that measures the fund family j
competitive and cooperative incentives at time t. We also include the Net competitive
(competitive - cooperative) effect. Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. We es-
timate the above model by using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method. The t-statistics
adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) are reported in parentheses. *
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and ***
denotes significance at the 1% level.
Family performance dispersion
Competitive 0.055∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(9.27) (5.53)
Cooperative -0.040∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(-10.07) (-5.99)
Net competitive 0.061∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(11.35) (6.49)
Family size (log TNA) -0.014∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(-3.88) (6.05) (-3.58) (6.37) (-3.21) (6.37)
Family funds (log) 0.090∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(8.19) (6.83) (8.05) (6.87) (8.62) (7.49)
Family age (log) 0.021∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.018∗∗
(2.39) (1.80) (2.02)
Family cash 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(6.88) (7.17) (6.96)
Family expense ratio 0.493∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(23.37) (23.47) (23.47)
Family turnover 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(9.06) (9.04) (9.15)
Family front load -0.119∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(-11.02) (-11.64) (-11.33)
Family gross return 1.210∗ 1.208∗ 1.204∗
(1.74) (1.74) (1.74)
No. of observations 86,333 86,209 86,333 86,209 86,333 86,209
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.145 0.008 0.144 0.011 0.145
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Table 6:
Family advisory revenue volatility
The table lists the results of following regression specification: RevStdj,t = β0 +
β1Competitive/Cooperativej,t + controls+ j,t, where RevStdj,t is the time-series stan-
dard deviation of family j aggregate advisory revenues at time t, using the past 24-month
observation. Family advisory fee revenues are collected for each fund from their semi-
annual N-SAR filings and then aggregated across all funds in the family. The dollar
value of advisory revenue is then converted into a percentage using lagged aggregate
family assets as the denominator and multiply by 100. Competitive/Cooperativej,t is a
standardized index that measures the fund family j competitive and cooperative incen-
tives at time t. We also include the Net competitive (competitive - cooperative) effect.
Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. We estimate the above model by using
the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method. The t-statistics adjusted for serial correlation using
Newey-West (1987) are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level,
** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Family revenue volatility
Competitive 0.103∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(9.83) (5.87)
Cooperative -0.084∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(-13.73) (-3.38)
Net competitive 0.057∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(8.91) (5.26)
Family size -0.002∗ -0.003∗ -0.002
(-1.87) (-1.89) (-1.60)
Family funds -0.011∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(-3.08) (-2.91) (-3.01)
Family age (log) -0.013∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(-8.91) (-10.94) (-10.00)
Family cash -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.30) (-0.87) (-1.06)
Family turnover 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(5.07) (6.36) (6.24)
Family front load 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(2.58) (2.36) (2.43)
Family gross return -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.02) (-1.00) (-1.01)
No. of observations 67,704 66,607 67,704 66,607 67,704 66,607
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.134 0.019 0.133 0.038 0.135
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Table 7:
Cash flow and return on assets volatility
The table lists the results of following regression specification: Instabilityi,t = β0 +
β1Competitive/Cooperativej,t+controls+i,t, where Instabilityi,t measures the volatil-
ity of cash flows, and return on assets of the publicly traded firm i at time t. Firm i is
the controlling company of fund advisor j. Volatility is calculated using the standard
deviation of the past 24 months. Competitive/Cooperativej,t is a standardized index
that measures the fund family j competitive and cooperative incentives at time t. We
also include the Net competitive (competitive - cooperative) effect. Variable definitions
are the Data Appendix. We estimate the above model by using the Fama-MacBeth
(1973) method. The constant term is included but not reported. The t-statistics ad-
justed for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) are reported in parentheses. *
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and ***
denotes significance at the 1% level.
Cash flows volatility Return on assets volatility
Competitive 0.008∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(2.79) (2.84)
Cooperative -0.005∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(-4.34) (-4.77)
Net competitive 0.010∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗
(3.44) (3.58)
Family size (log TNA) 0.000 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.012 0.029∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(0.89) (1.77) (1.69) (1.28) (2.14) (2.05)
Family funds (log) 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.006 -0.008 0.014
(0.68) (-0.35) (1.27) (0.51) (-0.49) (1.22)
Family age (log) 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.044∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(4.14) (2.04) (4.74) (3.90) (1.84) (4.53)
Family cash 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(5.49) (3.26) (4.86) (5.33) (3.14) (4.71)
Family turnover -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.008 -0.024 -0.005
(-0.13) (-0.85) (0.05) (-0.41) (-1.12) (-0.23)
Family front load -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗
(-3.72) (-3.59) (-3.64) (-3.94) (-3.77) (-3.82)
Family gross return 0.019 0.040 0.041 0.367 0.797 0.818
(0.22) (0.41) (0.45) (0.21) (0.41) (0.45)
No. of observations 15,253 15,253 15,253 15,333 15,333 15,333
Adjusted R2 0.046 0.037 0.044 0.042 0.033 0.040
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Table 8:
Active share and tracking error
The table lists the results of following regression specification: Activenessi,t = β0 +
β1Competitive/Cooperativej,t + controls+ i,t, where Activenessi,t measures the active
share and tracking error of fund i at time t. Active share and tracking error are ob-
tained from Cremers as in Cremers and Petajisto (2009). Competitive/Cooperativej,t
is a standardized index that measures the fund family j competitive and cooperative
incentives at time t. We also include the Net competitive (competitive - cooperative)
effect. Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. The constant term is included but
not reported. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses; standard errors are clustered
at the fund level. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the
5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Active share Tracking error
Competitive 0.015∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(7.01) (7.22)
Cooperative -0.009∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(-3.65) (-4.01)
Net competitive 0.016∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(6.33) (6.65)
Family size (log TNA) -0.003∗ -0.004∗∗ -0.002 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(-1.85) (-2.29) (-1.25) (-5.81) (-6.57) (-5.32)
Family funds (log) -0.017∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(-7.34) (-7.06) (-7.18) (-4.43) (-4.15) (-4.25)
Fund size (log TNA) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗
(0.31) (0.23) (0.08) (2.19) (2.07) (1.92)
Expense ratio (%) 0.083∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(11.51) (11.30) (11.34) (11.45) (11.37) (11.37)
Fund turnover -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(-1.15) (-1.19) (-1.16) (6.15) (6.07) (6.14)
Fund flows (monthly) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(-0.87) (-0.02) (-0.31) (-9.46) (-7.86) (-8.61)
Fund age 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(2.03) (2.02) (1.98) (3.09) (3.11) (3.07)
Style dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. of observations 342,683 342,683 342,683 342,683 342,683 342,683
Adjusted R2 0.325 0.319 0.324 0.357 0.352 0.356
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Table 10:
Coordinated behavior: cross-holding activity
The table presents the estimates of the likelihood associated with a fund being held
by other funds within the family in times of distress. We define a distressed fund if
it suffers an outflows larger than 5% during the quarter. Competitive/Cooperativej,t
is a standardized index that measures the fund family j competitive and cooperative
incentives at time t. We also include the Net competitive (competitive - cooperative)
effect. Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. We estimate the specification using
logistic regression with time and investment objective dummies interacted and robust
standard errors adjusted for fund-level clustering. * denotes significance at the 10%
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1%
level.
Cross-holding funds
Distress 1.259∗∗∗ 1.255∗∗∗ 1.248∗∗∗ 1.205∗∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗ 1.195∗∗∗
(8.39) (8.21) (7.99) (6.79) (6.60) (6.39)
Competitive 1.049 1.054∗
(1.55) (1.68)
Cooperative 0.980 0.989
(-0.69) (-0.37)
Net competitive 1.043 1.039
(1.27) (1.13)
Distress × Competitive 0.908∗∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗
(-3.13) (-2.90)
Distress × Cooperative 1.094∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗
(3.12) (2.83)
Distress × Net competitive 0.885∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗
(-3.87) (-3.51)
Style*Time dummies N N N Y Y Y
Time dummies Y Y Y N N N
Control Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. of observations 491,670 491,670 491,670 491,112 491,112 491,112
52
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986304 
Table 11:
Fund family incentives: clientele and distribution channel
The table lists the results of following regression specification:
Competitive/Cooperativej,t = β0 + β1InstitutionalClientelej,t + controls + i,t,
where Competitive/Cooperativej,t is a standardized index that measures the fund
family j competitive and cooperative incentives at time t. InstitutionalClientelej,t
measures proportion of family j assets under management from funds sold without
a load fee (Direct distribution channel) and whether fund family has managers that
not only run mutual funds but also other pooled investment vehicles (Side-by-side).
Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. We estimate the above model by using
the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method. The constant term is included but not reported.
The t-statistics adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) are reported in
parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5%
level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Net competitive index
Direct distribution channel 0.048∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(3.66) (2.27)
Side-by-side 0.054∗∗ 0.066∗
(2.45) (1.67)
Family size (log TNA) -0.090∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗
(-21.57) (-8.84) (-30.07) (-5.12)
Family funds (log) -0.192∗∗∗ -0.034 -0.168∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(-28.48) (-1.00) (-15.90) (3.01)
Family expense ratio 0.129∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗
(7.92) (-9.36) (5.10) (-2.12)
Family age (log) 0.081∗∗∗ 0.085
(13.26) (1.36)
Family stocks (log) -0.016∗ -0.080∗
(-1.94) (-1.67)
Family cash 0.006∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(10.45) (3.56)
Family turnover -0.008 -0.162∗∗
(-1.38) (-2.05)
Family gross return 0.600∗∗ -0.162
(2.31) (-0.05)
No. of observations 128,089 4,050 127,444 4,050
Adjusted R2 0.212 0.079 0.219 0.063
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Table 12:
The effect of investment advisor M&A on target funds
This table presents the effect of competition/cooperation incentives of the acquirer com-
pany on the funds of the target company, before and after the merger. The dependent
variables are the Active share, Tracking error, Cross-trading, and Fund cross-holding.
∆ Net competition measures the difference between the net competitive incentives of
the acquirer family and target family during the year before their target funds were
acquired. Post-event is a dummy variable that is equal to one during the 24 months
after the merger and zero during the prior 24 months. We estimate these models using
fund fixed-effects for funds of families that were acquired by other firms. The t-statistics
are reported in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at the fund and year level. *
denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and ***
denotes significance at the 1% level.
Target funds
Active share Tracking error Cross-trades Fund cross-holding
Post-event x ∆ Net Competition 0.026∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.335∗ -0.524∗∗∗
(4.61) (2.83) (-1.71) (-4.12)
Post-event 0.016∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.138 -0.612∗∗
(2.06) (3.81) (0.68) (-2.03)
Family size (log TNA) -0.020∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.056 -0.013
(-6.95) (-3.40) (-0.97) (-0.39)
Family funds (log) 0.009∗∗∗ -0.000 0.064 -0.037
(3.23) (-0.25) (1.23) (-0.78)
Fund size (log TNA) -0.007∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.060 0.076
(-3.83) (-2.96) (-1.12) (1.11)
Expense ratio (%) 0.013∗ -0.004∗ 0.277 0.664∗
(1.71) (-1.80) (1.54) (1.82)
Front load -0.022∗∗ -0.004 1.338∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗
(-2.17) (-0.87) (2.88) (-2.44)
Fund turnover -0.004 -0.001 0.226∗∗ -0.002
(-1.55) (-0.65) (2.42) (-0.03)
Fund age (log) 0.000 -0.001∗∗ -0.036 0.081∗∗
(0.05) (-1.98) (-0.58) (2.15)
Past returns (yearly) 0.013∗∗ -0.006∗ 0.289 0.087
(1.99) (-1.83) (1.57) (0.73)
Past flows -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.004
(-0.32) (1.45) (0.10) (-0.88)
Manager tenure -0.000 0.000 0.007 0.003
(-0.64) (0.71) (0.52) (0.23)
Fund FE Y Y Y Y
Time dummies Y Y Y Y
No. of observations 22,435 22,435 44,624 64,853
Adjusted R2 0.778 0.551 0.131 0.700
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Table 13:
Pseudo families: falsification test
This table shows the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation of the effect of net competitive
incentives on pseudo fund family strategies. The dependent variables are the overall
family performance, performance dispersion, cross-trading activity, and cross-holding at
the family level. Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. We estimate this model
for pseudo fund families that were constructed upon randomly assigned funds matching
on family size, number of funds, and fund style. The constant term is included but not
reported. The t-statistics adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) are
reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance
at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Falsification test: pseudo families
Family performance Performance dispersion Cross-trades Cross-holding
Net competitive 0.012 0.470 -0.009 0.095
(1.52) (1.30) (-1.34) (1.51)
Family size 0.033∗∗∗ 0.127 -0.021∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗
(6.06) (0.48) (-3.42) (-6.16)
Family funds -0.050∗∗∗ 49.983∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 3.249∗∗∗
(-3.29) (17.91) (8.11) (7.78)
Family age (log) -0.038∗∗∗ 2.249∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ -0.465∗∗∗
(-3.84) (5.35) (2.29) (-5.95)
Family cash -0.003 0.182∗∗∗ -0.001 0.013∗∗∗
(-1.37) (3.06) (-1.38) (3.79)
Family expense ratio 0.009 30.271∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.791∗∗∗
(0.26) (20.68) (-0.04) (-6.15)
Family turnover -0.001 5.993∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(-0.06) (6.18) (3.01) (5.11)
Family front load -0.046∗∗∗ -11.002∗∗∗ 0.019 -0.195∗∗
(-3.43) (-12.73) (1.13) (-2.33)
No. of observations 120,964 94,582 112,299 120,964
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.223 0.014 0.047
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Internet Appendix for
“Competition and cooperation in mutual fund families”
Richard B. Evans, Melissa Porras Prado, and Rafael Zambrana Galacho
This Internet Appendix reports the results of supplementary and robustness tests as
described below:
Figure A1: Figure of Net competitive index over time
Table A1: Individual components: competitive
Table A2: Individual components: cooperative
Table A3: Individual components
Table A4: Robustness checks: family characteristics
Table A5: Alternative approaches: Equity, TNA-Weighted, and EW components
Table A6: Fund performance: net returns
Table A7: Fund performance: other measures
Table A8: Star funds: fund level
Table A9: Family star funds: dummy variables
Table A10: Performance dispersion: dummy variables
Table A11: Recapturing flows
Table A12: Coordinated behavior: other variables
Table A13: Robustness checks: financial conglomerates
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Figure 1: Net competitive index over time.
This plot shows the breakdown of our indices of fund manager incentives, competitive
and cooperative, into two categories of the variables used: manager compensation in-
centives (e.g. manager ownership of the fund - competitive, manager ownership of the
investment advisor - cooperative) and fund management structure (e.g. solo-managed
fund - competitive or team-managed - cooperative).
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Table A1: Individual components: competitive
This table shows the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation of the effect of competitive and
cooperative incentives on fund family strategies. The dependent variables are the per-
centage cross-trading and cross-holding activity of the fund and the star fund family
strategies (proportion of star funds). Competitive and Cooperative are cross-sectional
ranks. Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. The constant term and family control
variables are included but not reported. The t-statistics adjusted for serial correlation
using Newey-West (1987) are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10%
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1%
level.
Competitive and cooperative incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
CIR measure 0.041∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ -0.011 0.007∗∗∗
(4.27) (3.66) (3.06) (-1.64) (3.23)
No. of observations 96,834 82,740 45,447 88,640 88,640
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.120 0.133 0.176 0.227
Competitive and cooperative incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Individual fund 0.015∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(3.34) (6.36) (-7.39) (-3.54) (3.33)
No. of observations 105,299 86,209 49,009 93,492 93,492
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.120 0.090 0.185 0.238
Competitive and cooperative incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Manager ownership 0.079∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.072 0.126∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(12.74) (8.05) (1.27) (43.65) (14.14)
No. of observations 81,893 66,566 44,131 71,572 71,572
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.115 0.140 0.263 0.208
Competitive and cooperative incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Bonus fund performance -0.094∗∗∗ 0.074∗ 0.066 -0.015 0.011∗∗
(-5.54) (1.86) (1.35) (-1.49) (2.56)
No. of observations 35,070 36,871 19,702 37,000 37,000
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.165 0.062 0.224 0.179
Competitive and cooperative incentives
Family Stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Bonus paid fund shares -0.013∗∗ -0.028 -0.316∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(-2.19) (-1.61) (-4.36) (2.62) (3.56)
No. of observations 35,070 36,871 19,702 37,000 37,000
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.165 0.113 0.223 0.175
Competitive and cooperative incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Bonus fund revenue 0.015∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.047 0.041∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(2.65) (2.28) (1.54) (23.27) (3.97)
No. of observations 35,070 36,871 19,702 37,000 37,000
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.169 0.095 0.231 0.175
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Table A2: Individual components: cooperative
This table shows the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation of the effect of competitive and
cooperative incentives on fund family strategies. The dependent variables are the per-
centage cross-trading and cross-holding activity of the fund and the star fund family
strategies (proportion of star funds). Competitive and Cooperative are cross-sectional
ranks. Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. The constant term and family control
variables are included but not reported. The t-statistics adjusted for serial correlation
using Newey-West (1987) are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10%
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1%
level.
Competitive and cooperative incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Other funds fee -0.031∗∗∗ 0.003 0.028 -0.025∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗
(-10.98) (0.22) (0.90) (-8.66) (-2.00)
No. of observations 102,100 85,452 48,279 91,829 91,829
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.118 0.108 0.184 0.229
Competitive and cooperative incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Team fund -0.038∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.017∗∗∗
(-7.08) (-4.00) (11.04) (0.65) (-9.71)
No. of observations 105,299 86,209 49,009 93,492 93,492
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.119 0.101 0.185 0.242
Competitive and cooperative incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Manager connected -0.013∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(-2.51) (-6.07) (2.23) (-3.58) (-7.83)
No. of observations 97,945 82,901 47,963 88,173 88,173
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.117 0.123 0.196 0.198
Competitive and cooperative incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking rrror
Managers/Fund ratio -0.047∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(-8.81) (-6.87) (16.80) (-7.09) (-8.91)
No. of observations 97,806 82,763 48,635 87,802 87,802
Adjusted R2 0.064 0.118 0.099 0.196 0.206
Competitive and cooperative incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Bonus paid adv equity -0.019∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(-2.53) (4.18) (23.59) (9.36) (12.20)
No. of observations 35,070 36,871 19,702 37,000 37,000
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.167 0.079 0.228 0.175
Competitive and cooperative incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Bonus adv contribution -0.010∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ 0.002 0.009∗∗∗
(-2.59) (-5.87) (-2.72) (0.55) (8.34)
No. of observations 35,070 36,871 19,702 37,000 37,000
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.168 0.075 0.224 0.183
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Table A3: Individual components
This table shows the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation of the effect of competitive and
cooperative incentives on fund family strategies. The dependent variables are the per-
centage cross-trading and cross-holding activity of the fund and the star fund family
strategies (proportion of star funds). Competitive and Cooperative are cross-sectional
ranks. Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. The constant term and family control
variables are included but not reported. The t-statistics adjusted for serial correlation
using Newey-West (1987) are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10%
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1%
level.
Panel A: competitive incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
CIR measure 0.031∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.018 0.017∗∗∗
(2.53) (6.91) (15.07) (1.16) (7.15)
Individual fund 0.009 0.062 -0.065∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.66) (1.34) (-2.89) (2.79) (5.62)
Manager ownership 0.094∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(12.33) (10.12) (-4.81) (34.96) (12.59)
Bonus-fund performance -0.094∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(-3.84) (2.94) (4.68) (-2.04) (3.70)
Bonus-paid in fund shares -0.005 0.001 -0.143∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(-0.79) (0.06) (-8.14) (3.03) (5.77)
Bonus-fund revenue 0.007∗ -0.000 0.050∗ 0.032∗∗∗ -0.000
(1.82) (-0.01) (1.93) (10.81) (-0.60)
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.174 0.155 0.294 0.234
Panel B: cooperative incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Other funds fee -0.006∗∗ -0.012 -0.006 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.001
(-2.33) (-1.09) (-0.16) (-3.59) (-1.11)
Team fund 0.007 -0.106∗∗∗ 0.026 -0.014 -0.015∗∗∗
(0.43) (-2.60) (0.53) (-1.02) (-9.20)
Manager connected -0.012∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(-2.51) (-5.34) (3.92) (-2.40) (-4.84)
Managers/Funds ratio -0.064∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(-7.14) (-3.46) (5.39) (-8.04) (-6.09)
Bonus-paid in advisor equity -0.017∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(-2.16) (4.39) (9.40) (10.73) (10.65)
Bonus-overall advisor revenue -0.015∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.050∗ -0.002 0.008∗∗∗
(-4.08) (-6.09) (-1.76) (-0.53) (8.82)
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.150 0.173 0.192 0.232 0.196
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Table A4: Robustness checks: family characteristics
Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. We estimate these models by using the
Fama-MacBeth (1973) method. The constant term is included but not reported. The
t-statistics adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) are reported in paren-
theses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level,
and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Panel A: style concentrated (HHI>0.95) families
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Net competitive 0.019∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(10.50) (3.37) (-10.66) (3.46) (6.32)
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.072 0.085 0.120 0.201
Panel B: large families (top 4th quartile)
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Net competitive 0.031∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(8.23) (12.49) (-3.20) (11.54) (5.92)
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.150 0.067 0.283 0.198
Panel C: families with shrinking assets
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Net competitive 0.008∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(4.51) (4.31) (-6.06) (5.16) (6.39)
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.157 0.172 0.180 0.286
Panel D: families with growing assets
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Net competitive 0.025∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(11.41) (5.53) (-3.49) (5.56) (10.80)
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.123 0.134 0.214 0.241
Continue on next page
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Continued from previous page
Panel E: families with below median fee
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Net competitive 0.014∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(6.80) (5.48) (-3.15) (3.45) (5.90)
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.085 0.123 0.210 0.144
Panel F: families with above median fee
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Net competitive 0.022∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.100 0.013∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(10.33) (6.04) (0.70) (8.53) (13.46)
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.077 0.127 0.170 0.219
Panel G: sample period: 2005-2015
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Net competitive 0.021∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(9.48) (8.76) (-10.50) (18.47) (14.87)
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.114 0.143 0.249 0.237
Panel H: sample period: 2005-2015 (excluding financial crisis (2007-2010))
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Net competitive 0.018∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(5.39) (6.52) (-7.01) (12.62) (13.31)
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.117 0.129 0.236 0.240
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Table A5: Alternative approaches: Equity, TNA-Weighted, and EW components
This table shows the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation of the effect of competitive and
cooperative incentives on fund family strategies considering different ways of estimating
family incentive scheme indices. In Panel A we consider only the equity information of
fund families. Panel B shows the results of creating the indices using a TNA-weighted
average of the fund characteristics. In Panel C, we aggregate the components of the
indices into two categories (human capital, and fund/manager compensation incentives)
and give the same weight to each category. The dependent variables are the percentage
cross-trading and cross-holding activity of the fund and the star fund family strate-
gies (proportion of star funds). Competitive/Cooperative is a standardized index that
measures fund family j competitive, cooperative and Net competitive (competitive -
cooperative) incentives. Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. The constant term
and family control variables are included but not reported. The t-statistics adjusted
for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) are reported in parentheses. * denotes
significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level.
Panel A: Only domestic equity
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Net competitive 0.020∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(13.98) (7.66) (-7.42) (5.08) (10.01)
No. of observations 98,159 83,799 46,362 93,037 93,037
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.125 0.097 0.196 0.239
Panel B: TNA-weighted
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Net competitive 0.020∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(13.16) (8.68) (-5.92) (6.34) (11.17)
No. of observations 105,299 86,209 49,009 93,492 93,492
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.120 0.111 0.191 0.242
Panel C: Equally-weighted components
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Net competitive 0.018∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(13.26) (7.09) (-4.47) (6.02) (10.23)
No. of observations 105,299 86,209 49,009 93,492 93,492
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.120 0.115 0.190 0.241
Continue on next page
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Continued from previous page
Panel D: Components ranked by investment objective
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Net competitive 0.017∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(11.22) (9.21) (-7.29) (7.19) (9.66)
No. of observations 105,299 86,209 49,009 93,492 93,492
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.120 0.100 0.192 0.241
Panel E: PCA for cooperative incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
PCA cooperative -0.006∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(-2.35) (-9.81) (2.48) (-1.83) (-4.52)
No. of Observations 34,655 36,529 19,601 36,603 36,603
Adjusted R2 0.136 0.171 0.180 0.229 0.176
Panel F: PCA for competitive incentives
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
PCA competitive 0.016∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.086 0.023∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(6.38) (2.72) (0.72) (12.98) (9.86)
No. of observations 28,512 29,577 17,091 29,791 29,791
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.163 0.174 0.250 0.219
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Table A6: Fund performance: net returns
The table lists the results of following regression specification: FundPerformancei,t =
β0+β1Competitive/Cooperativej,t+controls+i,t, where FundPerformancei,t measures
the performance of fund i at time t using the objective-adjusted returns after fees.
Competitive/Cooperativej,t is a standardized index that measures the fund family j
competitive and cooperative incentives at time t. We also include the Net competitive
(competitive - cooperative) effect. Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. We
estimate the above model by using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method. The constant
term is included but not reported. The t-statistics adjusted for serial correlation using
Newey-West (1987) are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level,
** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Net performance
Competitive 0.018∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(4.11) (3.85)
Cooperative -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗
(-2.39) (-2.43)
Net competitive 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(3.53) (3.43)
Family size (log TNA) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(5.63) (3.03) (5.26) (2.83) (6.18) (3.37)
Family funds (log) 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.58) (0.49) (0.73) (0.65) (0.68) (0.59)
Fund size (log TNA) 0.005 0.005 0.005
(1.10) (1.02) (1.05)
Fund turnover 0.009 0.010 0.010
(0.60) (0.61) (0.61)
Fund flows (monthly) 0.343∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(6.83) (6.85) (6.84)
Fund age -0.010∗ -0.009∗ -0.010∗
(-1.72) (-1.66) (-1.73)
Style dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. of observations 1,015,964 1,006,554 1,015,964 1,006,554 1,015,964 1,006,554
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.019 0.005 0.019 0.006 0.019
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Table A8: Star funds: fund level
The table lists a logistic specification to determine the likelihood associated with
a fund being a star fund. We present both the odd ratio and t-statistics.
CompetitiveFamily/CooperativeFamilyj,t is indicator variable for families with above
median competitive, cooperative and net competitive incentives scheme. We also include
the Net competitive (competitive - cooperative) effect. Variable definitions are the Data
Appendix. Time dummies, investment objective dummies and the constant term are
also included but not reported. We estimate the above model by using logistic regres-
sion. Robust t-statistics adjusted for fund-level clustering are reported in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and ***
denotes significance at the 1% level.
Prob (Star fund==1)
Competitive 1.267∗∗∗ 1.239∗∗∗
(9.08) (8.43)
Cooperative 0.818∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗
(-7.10) (-5.48)
Net competitive 1.321∗∗∗ 1.263∗∗∗
(10.02) (8.59)
Family size (log TNA) 0.985 0.931∗∗∗ 0.983 0.930∗∗∗ 1.003 0.951∗∗
(-1.11) (-3.42) (-1.24) (-3.38) (0.20) (-2.32)
Family funds (log) 1.030 1.205∗∗∗ 1.039 1.240∗∗∗ 1.036 1.214∗∗∗
(1.04) (3.76) (1.36) (4.25) (1.26) (3.87)
Family stocks (log) 0.902∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗
(-3.37) (-3.90) (-3.45)
Fund size (log TNA) 1.173∗∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ 1.150∗∗∗
(4.55) (4.05) (3.96)
Expense ratio (%) 1.963∗∗∗ 1.910∗∗∗ 1.917∗∗∗
(11.95) (11.53) (11.57)
Fund turnover 1.114∗∗∗ 1.109∗∗∗ 1.113∗∗∗
(5.88) (5.57) (5.85)
Past returns (yearly) 18.889∗∗∗ 19.110∗∗∗ 18.835∗∗∗
(37.17) (37.33) (37.13)
Fund flows (monthly) 1.000 1.000 1.000
(1.12) (1.24) (1.29)
Fund ranking revenues 1.010 1.014 1.017
(0.59) (0.86) (1.02)
Style dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. of observations 794,685 780,678 794,685 780,678 794,685 780,678
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Table A9: Family star funds: dummy variables
The table lists the results of following regression specification: FamStarFundsj, t =
β0 + β1CompetitiveFamily/CooperativeFamilyj,t + controls + j,t, where
FamStarFundsj, t is the proportion of star funds in family j at time t.
CompetitiveFamily/CooperativeFamilyj,t is indicator variable for families with
above median competitive, cooperative and net competitive incentives scheme. We also
include the Net competitive (competitive - cooperative) effect. Variable definitions are
the Data Appendix. We estimate the above model by using the Fama-MacBeth (1973)
method. The constant term is included but not reported. The t-statistics adjusted
for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) are reported in parentheses. * denotes
significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level.
Star funds strategy
Competitive family 0.025∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(13.28) (11.18)
Cooperative family -0.024∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(-6.73) (-7.85)
Net competitive family 0.030∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(10.30) (10.61)
Family size (log TNA) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(10.74) (16.67) (10.21) (16.30) (10.77) (16.87)
Family funds (log) -0.025∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗
(-7.84) (-9.41) (-7.81) (-9.16) (-7.76) (-9.26)
Family age (log) -0.023∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(-14.27) (-16.42) (-15.78)
Family cash 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(5.86) (6.01) (5.86)
Family expense ratio 0.050∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(15.80) (15.81) (15.41)
Family turnover 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(2.24) (2.05) (2.27)
Family front load -0.029∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(-10.18) (-10.89) (-10.25)
Family gross return 0.359∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗
(2.91) (3.02) (2.95)
No. of observations 105,435 105,299 105,435 105,299 105,435 105,299
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.072 0.019 0.076 0.019 0.074
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Table A10: Performance dispersion: dummy variables
The table lists the results of following regression specification: PerfDispj,t = β0 +
β1CompetitiveFamily/CooperativeFamilyj,t+ controls+ j,t, where PerfDispj,t is the
cross-sectional standard deviation of objective-adjusted fund returns of family j at time t.
CompetitiveFamily/CooperativeFamilyj,t is indicator variable for families with above
median competitive, cooperative and net competitive incentives scheme. We also include
the Net competitive (competitive - cooperative) effect. Variable definitions are the Data
Appendix. We estimate the above model by using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method.
The constant term is included but not reported. The t-statistics adjusted for serial
correlation using Newey-West (1987) are reported in parentheses. * denotes significance
at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes significance at
the 1% level.
Family performance dispersion
Competitive family 0.056∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(6.00) (3.85)
Cooperative family -0.041∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(-5.06) (-4.56)
Net competitive family 0.096∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(10.14) (6.66)
Family size (log TNA) -0.016∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(-4.05) (5.96) (-4.06) (6.32) (-3.30) (6.36)
Family funds (log) 0.085∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(7.60) (6.21) (7.75) (6.43) (8.13) (6.77)
Family age (log) 0.020∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(2.26) (2.02) (2.01)
Family cash 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(7.06) (7.42) (7.05)
Family expense ratio 0.497∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(23.23) (23.69) (23.43)
Family turnover 0.114∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(8.91) (8.99) (9.15)
Family front load -0.121∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
(-11.33) (-11.50) (-11.20)
Family gross return 1.198∗ 1.226∗ 1.216∗
(1.73) (1.76) (1.76)
No. of observations 86,333 86,209 86,333 86,209 86,333 86,209
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.144 0.008 0.144 0.011 0.145
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Table A11: Recapturing flows
This table reports estimates of regressions of monthly fund outflows on family and fund
characteristics. The fund outflows data come from N-SAR question 28a-f. The indepen-
dent variables include a standardized index that measures the fund family competitive
incentives (Competitive), a standardized index that measures the fund family coopera-
tive incentives (Cooperative), the average outflows to all other funds in the fund family
(Family outflows), the family size and number of funds, the size, expense ratio, turnover,
performance, fund ranking revenues, the lagged fund outflows (Fund outflows t-1 ), and
the average outflows to all funds in the same investment objective (Style outflows).
Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. We estimate the above model by using
the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method. The constant term is included but not reported.
The t-statistics adjusted for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) are reported in
parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5%
level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Fund outflows
Competitive 0.110∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(6.38) (5.09) (5.32) (4.13)
Cooperative -0.045∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.018
(-2.54) (-2.81) (-0.26) (-0.89)
Competitive x Family inflows -0.030∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(-4.59) (-3.95) (-3.62) (-3.30)
Cooperative x Family inflows 0.020∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.008
(3.12) (1.98) (2.07) (1.12)
Family inflows 0.267∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗
(28.17) (28.35) (26.24) (26.44) (29.06) (29.15)
Fund outflows t-1 0.699∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗
(53.23) (51.99) (55.64) (54.37) (55.29) (53.95)
Style outflows 0.389∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗
(16.04) (13.48) (15.54) (12.78) (15.72) (13.21)
Family size (log TNA) 0.136∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(11.53) (11.50) (11.50)
Family funds (log) -0.028∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(-2.75) (-2.17) (-3.06)
Fund size (log TNA) -0.301∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗
(-14.20) (-14.28) (-14.20)
Expense ratio (%) 0.065∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(2.91) (2.42) (2.79)
Fund turnover 0.087∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(5.64) (6.52) (5.90)
Gross performance -0.063∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(-8.23) (-8.36) (-8.30)
Fund ranking revenues 0.040∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(5.44) (5.54) (5.25)
Style dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. of observations 607,815 600,576 607,815 600,576 607,815 600,576
Adjusted R2 0.683 0.688 0.681 0.687 0.685 0.690
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Table A12: Coordinated behavior: other variables
The table lists the results of the following regression specification: Coordinationj,t =
β0 +β1NetCompetitivej,t+controls+j,t, where Coordinationj,t proxies for coordinated
behavior and resource sharing. Cross-assets trading is the average frequency in which
both equity and bond funds simultaneously hold a security of the same firm as a fraction
of the total number of holdings in the asset management company. Stock weight % funds
is the average across all stocks in the family of the number of portfolios holding a stock
over the number of portfolios in the family. Stock weight % assets is a Herfindahl index
of the fund family holdings, more precisely its the sum of the squares of the portfolio
holdings within a fund family weighted by the family total holdings size. Adopt time is
the average across funds in the family of the time lapsed in quarters between the initiation
of the position (the date the first fund in the family purchased the stock over the past
year) and when other funds in the family also purchased the stock. Variable definitions
are the Data Appendix. We estimate the above model by using the Fama-MacBeth
(1973) method. The constant term is included but not reported. The t-statistics adjusted
for serial correlation using Newey-West (1987) are reported in parentheses. * denotes
significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level.
Cross-assets trading Stock weight % funds Stock weight % assets Adopt time
Net competitive -1.034∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗
(-6.85) (-2.68) (-2.06) (5.25)
Family size (log TNA) 1.824∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.048
(6.63) (5.89) (8.83) (1.04)
Family age (log) 2.401∗∗∗ -0.584∗∗∗ -0.080 5.235∗∗∗
(10.23) (-5.18) (-0.81) (15.71)
Family funds (log) 4.938∗∗∗ -1.671∗∗∗ -1.524∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗∗
(6.35) (-18.25) (-21.46) (6.84)
Family turnover 0.977∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ -0.949∗∗∗
(4.96) (5.86) (9.23) (-7.41)
Gross performance 0.049 -0.067∗∗ -0.072 0.060
(0.71) (-2.22) (-1.64) (1.45)
No. of observations 52,254 127,880 127,880 120,044
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.085 0.023 0.096
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Table A13: Robustness checks: financial conglomerates
After is a dummy equal 1 for families that are part of a large financial conglomerates.
Variable definitions are the Data Appendix. The constant term is included but not
reported. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at
the family level. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the
5% level, and *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Financial conglomerates
Family stars Performance dispersion Cross-trading Active share Tracking error
Financial conglomerate parent -0.021 0.049 0.051 -0.007 -0.007
(-1.30) (0.68) (0.89) (-0.25) (-1.32)
Net competitive 0.021∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(5.58) (2.43) (-2.84) (1.93) (3.56)
Financial conglomerate parent -0.005 0.045 0.013 0.032 -0.006
× Net competitive (-0.37) (0.80) (0.22) (1.48) (-1.35)
Family size (log TNA) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.007 0.005∗ 0.000
(10.58) (3.22) (0.86) (1.86) (0.10)
Family funds (log) -0.025∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.030∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(-5.93) (2.53) (1.97) (-5.30) (-4.46)
Family age (log) -0.026∗∗∗ 0.022 0.004 -0.006 -0.000
(-5.29) (1.09) (0.19) (-1.00) (-0.04)
Family cash 0.001∗∗∗ 0.005∗ -0.001 0.001 0.001∗∗∗
(3.27) (1.68) (-0.97) (1.02) (3.26)
Family expense ratio 0.057∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(7.19) (13.12) (-2.48) (8.14) (7.82)
Family turnover 0.007 0.158∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.010 0.007∗∗∗
(1.64) (4.87) (0.28) (-1.46) (2.89)
Family front load -0.033∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(-4.34) (-4.18) (3.61) (-3.28) (-4.17)
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y
No. of observations 105,299 86,209 49,009 93,492 93,492
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.402 0.152 0.193 0.351
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